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I. INTRODUCTION: THE IDEA OF A DEMOCRATIC CULTURE
A. Democracy's Sociological Predicament
Democracies are societies. Behind the formal features of democratic self-
governance-whether regular elections or majority rule-lie social organization
and social structure. Like other societies, democracies have varying degrees of
social stratification and social hierarchy, group competition and group
subordination. But democracies are special in this respect: Their political ideals
seem partly in tension with their social structures. Democracy is more than a
commitment to a set of procedures for resolving disputes. It is more than a
culture of respect for those procedures. Democratic ideals seem to require a
further commitment to democratic forms of social structure and social
organization, a commitment to social as well as political equality.
Imagine a democracy organized according to strict lines of racial caste, in
which all citizens have equal rights to express their views, vote and hold
office, but in which job opportunities and life chances are practically and
definitively limited by membership in one's social group. Government
discrimination based on caste membership is strictly forbidden, but the social
hierarchy remains rigidly in place even without the overt support of law. The
citizens of this society take their commitment to voting and freedom of speech
very seriously, yet as a society they seem equally committed to their traditional
social structure. In one sense this society is a democracy, and yet in another
it is very antidemocratic. Indeed, it is hard to imagine this society precisely
because we think that accepting the democratic ideal of equal citizenship is
inconsistent with social caste; this principle will either ultimately corrode a
t Lafayette S. Foster Professor, Yale Law School. My thanks to Bruce Ackerman. Akhl Amar. Owen
Fiss, Robert Gordon, Sandy Levinson, Reva Siegel. and Jim Whitman for their comments on previous
drafts.
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society's social organization or be co-opted and disfigured by it.' Of course,
that is precisely my point: Democratic ideals do tend to corrode hierarchies;
they tend to push social organization in particular directions, unless and until
they are deflected and blunted by even stronger social forces.
Ideally, one might think, in a truly democratic society all unjust forms of
social stratification-caste being only the most extreme example-would cease
to exist. The democratic ideal must include the idea of a democratic culture:
one that opposes all unjust hierarchies of status, and that promotes equal status
and equal standing for all its members. Thus the democratic ideal calls for a
social revolution: not only a transformation in legal form but in social
structure. Indeed, this revolution cannot be achieved through legal regulation
alone, for law is usually complicit in the preservation of existing social
structure, even when its asserted purpose is to reform that structure.
Democratic culture requires changes in all the devices of social stratification,
even those that persist in the face of legal reform.
In this sense, no democracy is fully realized until it becomes a democratic
society with a democratic culture. Yet we also know that democratic
institutions have always existed in societies with various forms of social
stratification and unjust social hierarchy. The America of 1800, for example,
thought itself a democracy, and yet it was also a society in which aristocratic
privilege still reigned, in which women were subordinate to men and blacks
were chattel. It was a democracy in a profoundly undemocratic society.
Nor is this example exceptional. Indeed, it is the standard case. Democracy
always exists in a sociological predicament: Democracy is not merely a
procedure, but a form of social organization never fully realized. The deepest
ideals of democracy are in tension with the social world in which all
democracies exist and have always existed; democracies are always begun and
carried out in the shadow of older regimes, existing social structures, past
misdeeds, and continuing injustices. If social hierarchy is a sin to democratic
ideals, then democracy always exists in a fallen condition, a penitent
perpetually in hope of redemption. Democracies are always unfinished projects;
they are always, in some sense, antidemocratic.
Because democracies are societies, they have social structures; they contain
different social groups with different places in those social structures. These
social groups have contrasting social identities. They compete with each other
for social esteem and material resource, for privilege and prestige. They have
conflicting views about society; they have conflicting views about morality.
And all of their conflicts are played out against the backdrop of those social
hierarchies-just and unjust-that exist in any actual democracy.
1. India is perhaps the most obvious example of the eventual compromises that must be forged
between democratic equality and the maintenance of social caste, but the United States is an equally
compelling instance of compromise between democratic ideals and social structure.
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Constitutional lawyers know that group conflicts are inevitable features of
democratic life. What is more difficult to determine is the Constitution's proper
role in dealing with these conflicts. Does the Constitution merely lay down
rules of fair competition in the endless struggles of social groups? Or does it
take sides in some of these struggles because the Constitution is a charter of
democracy, because democratic ideals commit us to break down older forms
of social hierarchy and to democratize social structure? What role, in short,
should the Constitution play in what I have called democracy's sociological
predicament?
In this Essay, I argue that the Constitution is committed to the realization
of a democratic culture, even though constitutional law-and indeed, law
generally-cannot realize this goal by its own efforts. Large-scale changes in
social structure require social transformation over long periods of time, and
law forms only a part of that phenomenon. But to understand the
Constitution's proper role in forging a democratic culture, we must understand
something about the nature of social hierarchies and how social groups struggle
for power and status within those hierarchies.2
2. Thus, this Essay is in a tradition of legal academic wnting that looks to sociological rcahtites to
understand the Constitution's commitments to social equality
In my view, this approach originates with Charles Black's cultural defense of Brn v Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lahfidness of the Segregation Dec1uroru.
69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960). In the 1970s, the two most important exponents of this sociological approich
were Owen Fiss and Kenneth Karst. See, e.g., Owen M Ftss. Groups and the Equal Prorection Clause. 5
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976); Kenneth L. Karst, Te Supreme Court, 1976 Tenn-Fore'ord Equal
Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARv L. RhV I (1977) Fiss's insistence" that "I'there
are... social groups," Fiss, supra, at 148, has unfortunately gone unheeded by the current Supreme Court
Fiss emphasized the sociological question of subordination in contrast to the legal question of equal
treatment. See id. at 108, 154-58, 170-75. Karst emphasized the processes of social meamng by which
individuals understand themselves as members of groups and through which groups are declared
subordinate and superordinate. See Karst, supra, at 5-11. Each view complements the other While
acknowledging the dignitary elements of subordination, Fiss's theory of group dtsadvantage has tended to
emphasize conditions of material deprivation; while acknowledging the importance of matenal deprivation.
Karst's equal citizenship principle has tended to focus on social messages of inferiority
Both the ideas of social subordination and cultural meaning have continued to be central to feminist
and critical race theory scholarship in the 1980s and 1990s See. eg. CATHtARINE A MACKI.NNON.
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987) (emphasizing reality of group
subordination); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id. the Ego, and Equal Pruiectn Reckonmig with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (emphasizing systems of cultural meaning)
The theory of status groups helps tic both strands of this tradition together First. focusing on status
groups gives us a much stronger account of what social groups are The theory of status groups comes
already equipped with an account of social stratification on the one hand. and group conflict on the other
Second, this theory argues that the identity of social groups in a social hierarchy is dependent on the
identities of other social groups. Hence group identity is connected both to social meanings-the positive
and negative associations of groups vis-A-vis each other-and to the group's place in the social structure
Groups fight about status because they are fighting about their relative social identities
Most writers in this tradition (including Black. Fiss. Karst, Lawrence. and many others) have ried
to explain the proper interpretation of a single clause of the Constitution the Equal Protection Clause I
believe that our proper focus should be on understanding the ongoing social revolutions in American
society that are later understood through many different clauses of the Constitution It is also important to
take some critical distance from the project of doctrinal exegesis Constitutional doctnne is both a rellection
of the demand for social equality and a means of blunting or avoiding the dismantling of status hierarchies
Precisely because the Equal Protection Clause seems on its face to concern what equality means at any
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America's commitment to a democratic culture began with the social
revolution against aristocratic privilege that formed the basis of the American
Revolution. The political act of revolution accompanied a deeper and longer-
lasting social transformation. The egalitarian urge of the American Revolution
is enshrined in the Declaration of Independence and forms the underlying spirit
of our constitutional tradition. The social revolution let loose in the 1770s
hardly ended with the Founding; it has gained strength over time and has
propelled itself through American history, undermining different elements of
then-existing social hierarchies, and continuing to this day through many social
movements and social transformations that have left their mark both on
American society and the Constitution itself.
To see the Constitution's relation to this revolution, we must think of the
Constitution not in terms of its individual clauses, but as a document whose
interpretation has responded to social movements demanding changes in social
structure. To appreciate the meaning of democratic culture, we must think less
in terms of familiar legal categories of unequal treatment and more in terms
of underlying sociological realities: the existence and the perpetuation of unjust
status hierarchies. To confront the problem of social equality, we must
confront the problem of social structure. To understand the Constitution, we
must understand the constitution of status.
B. Kulturkampfs and the Constitution
Whether they recognize it or not, courts constantly face the problem of
social hierarchy in cases involving group conflict. The U.S. Supreme Court
was faced with the problem once again when it considered the constitutionality
of Colorado's Amendment 2 in Romer v. Evans.3 Amendment 2 repealed
existing local ordinances that protected homosexuals from discrimination, and
effectively required a state constitutional amendment to reinstate any of them.
From one perspective, Romer v. Evans concerned only a dry issue of local
government law: whether state referenda could require that regulatory decisions
be made at the state level rather than at the level of local municipalities. Yet
the parties and the Justices of the Supreme Court alike understood that the
point in time, doctrines of equal protection will often serve as the means through which status hierarchies
will attempt to preserve themselves.
3. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
4. The Amendment read as follows:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation. Neither the State
of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its agencies, political
subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute,
regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct,
practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or
class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or
claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b.
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campaign for the Amendment, and the battle over its constitutionality, signified
something much more. They were symptomatic of an important cultural
struggle in the United States: the struggle over gay rights and the status of
homosexuals in American society.
The Court intervened in this cultural dispute, but only in the most tentative
way. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion claimed that Amendment 2 was
unconstitutional in part because it rested upon "'a bare ... desire to harm a
politically unpopular group."' 5 The Constitution, Justice Kennedy seemed to
say, allows social groups to struggle and majorities to have their way. But
majorities cannot express overt hatred for groups by declaring them legally
unprotected, or strangers to the law.6
Justice Scalia's dissent strongly took issue with this characterization. To
his credit, Justice Scalia did not attempt to hide the political background of the
case behind a veneer of neutral principles. Indeed, he made the political
context central to his opinion. In his view, the Constitution had nothing to say
about this particular social struggle; he rejected the majority's contention that
Amendment 2 reflected irrational hatred or invidious animus. "The Court,"
argued Justice Scalia, "has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite."'
Justice Scalia insisted that hatred of homosexuals and homosexuality did
not necessarily motivate the Amendment. Rather, it might have been designed
merely to "preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a politically
powerful minority to revise those mores through use of the laws."' To be sure,
Colorado had repealed its criminalization of homosexual sodomy. Nevertheless,
Justice Scalia argued, its citizens might well have wanted to decriminalize
sodomy while still expressing moral disapproval of it.9 They may have wanted
to preserve the idea that homosexuality is not simply a lifestyle choice as
worthy as heterosexuality. And they may have wanted to resist a drive by gay
activists toward "achieving not merely a grudging social toleration, but full
social acceptance, of homosexuality.""0
The miasma that is contemporary equal protection doctrine created genuine
problems for the majority, problems that bolstered Justice Scalia's argument.
The majority seemed to accept that only a showing of severe and invidious
animus toward homosexuals-what it called "'a bare... desire to harm a
politically unpopular group""'-could justify striking down Amendment 2
5. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (quoting Department of Agnc. v Moreno. 413 U S 528, 534 (1973))
The actual holding of Romer is and likely will continue to be disputed for some time, but concerns about
antihomosexual animus and the desire to stigmatize homosexuals seemed to be a central pan of Justice
Kennedy's opinion, and it was this feature that Justice Scalia particularly focused upon
6. See Romer, 116 S. CL at 1629.
7. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
8. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
9. See id. at 1633 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 1634 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
II. Id. at 1628 (quoting Department of Agric. v. Moreno. 413 U S 528. 534 (1973))
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where neither a suspect classification nor a fundamental right was involved.
Hence it argued that Amendment 2 was motivated by just such hatred, a hatred
it inferred from the breadth and scope of the Amendment's prohibitions."
Yet, as Justice Scalia suggested, Amendment 2 actually involved nothing more
than one of the many recurrent struggles over the terms of American society's
culture and morality. Although such struggles may cause tempers to flare and
even lead to occasional violence, they do not necessarily involve widespread
and invidious hatred or the bare desire to harm opponents. At bottom, these
struggles concern whose moral and cultural vision shall prevail.
The waging of these cultural struggles, Justice Scalia reasoned, is best left
to the democratic process. Democracies often operate without a moral
consensus on many significant issues, and their citizens may have widely
divergent views about what is moral and immoral; but the Constitution permits
majorities to impose their vision of morality as long as no fundamental right
or suspect classification is affected. The best example of this principle is
Bowers v. Hardwick,13 in which the Court argued that Georgia's
criminalization of homosexual sodomy could be justified by moral disapproval
by a majority of its citizens. It was no accident, Justice Scalia thought, that the
majority avoided citing this opinion in Romer.'4
Justice Scalia's argument, in short, is that cultural struggles over moral
vision are best left to the political process and to the judgments of ordinary
people, not to the judgment of unelected elites in the federal judiciary.'"
Elites who disagree with the moral views of majorities may well regard them
as nothing more than unthinking prejudice, and it is a short slide from this
smug conclusion to branding majority opinion as irrational hatred. But this
accusation is both unfair and deeply confused; it misunderstands the social
reality of cultural conflict and the pervasiveness of social struggle. It is itself
an example of the prejudice it attributes to others.
Justice Scalia tried to invoke this idea of democratic struggle over moral
values by using the term "Kulturkampf." Ironically, Justice Scalia, who is so
fond of dictionaries, failed to consult one in this case. The word
"Kulturkampf' is defined as a "conflict between civil government and religious
authorities esp. over control of education and church appointments."' 6 The
original Kulturkampf was an attempt by German nationalists to destroy the
political power of the Catholic Church by, among other things, seizing control
of church appointments and arresting Catholic priests.' 7 Presumably even the
12. See id. at 1627-29.
13. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
14. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
15. See id. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
16. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 648 (10th ed. 1993).
17. The original Kulturkampf was part of Otto von Bismarck's campaign for a unified sense of
German nationhood. The expression "Kulturkampf' was coined in a March 1873 election appeal by Rudolf
Virchow, who referred to the struggle against the Catholic Church as a struggle for culture. See E.J.
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author of Employment Division v. Smith8 would agree that the Constitution
is implicated in such an action.
Today the term "Kulturkampf' is sometimes applied more broadly to
denote any struggle between groups over a common national culture. It
presupposes both the existence of social groups with distinct identities and
conflicts between them over values, status, power, and authority. That was the
rough sense in which Justice Scalia used the term. He meant it innocently, of
course, but in hindsight his unintentional reference to a sustained government
attempt to destroy the political power of Catholics is both ironic and eerily
appropriate.
Scalia was right to see Romer as part of a larger struggle over morality
and culture. But he was wrong to think that the Constitution is necessarily
silent in such a struggle. Just as the original Kulturkampf in Germany
implicated human rights questions, so too group conflict over social status and
moral authority is one of the deep concerns of the Constitution. The question
is not whether the Constitution is implicated in cultural struggles, but how it
is implicated.
Both Amendment 2 and the gay rights movement to which it responds are
symptoms of a larger social phenomenon: a gradual but accelerating
breakdown of a powerful hierarchy of social status buttressed by a system of
social meanings. This hierarchy understood heterosexuality as normal, moral,
and honorable, and homosexuality as abnormal, immoral, and stigmatizing by
comparison. As this hierarchy has begun to break down, the certainty of these
social meanings has begun to dissolve, and with it the hierarchies of status,
authority, and moral prestige that go with them. Groups whose worldviews are
most undermined by such changes, as well as people who have the most to
lose from a change in status relationships, will understandably seek to halt
what they see as an accelerating slide toward moral degeneration. In such
moments a certain kind of cultural struggle is born: a rearguard action in which
an older order of social meaning tries to prevent the emergence of a newer
one. The outcome of such a struggle cannot always be foreseen, but its
PASSANT, A SHORT HISTORY OF GEiMANY 1815-1945, at 88-90 (1960). At Bismarck's instigation. the
German government attempted to undermine the strength of the Catholic political party, the Zentrum. by
asserting control over Church functions and appointments The government arrested clergymen who reststed
its initiatives, and left many parishes without priests. Ultimately, the heavy-handed persecuuon of political
Catholicism backfired. The Zentrum was actually strengthened and remained an important force in German
politics well into the twentieth century. See GORDON A CRAIG. GEtANY 1866-1945. at 70-78. 280-81
(1978); ELLEN LOVELL EVANS, THE GERMAN CENTER PARTY 1870-1933. A STUDY IN POLITICAL
CATHOLIcISM 36-95 (1981); 2 Oro PFLANZE. BISMARCK AND THE DEVELoPMFEfT oi- GERMANY. THE
PERIOD OF CONSOLIDATION 1871-1880, at 179-206 (1990). H.A.trr WAL..sEt SstmI, GERMLtN
NATIONALISM AND RELIGIOUS CONFLICT: CULTURE. IDEOLOGY. POLITIcS. 1870-1914. at 19-20. 37-50
(1995); HANS-ULRICH WEHLER. THE GERMAN EMPIRE 1871-1918. at 76-78 (1985)
18. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that rules of general application that adversely affect religious
practice do not violate Free Exercise Clause)
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urgency and deep symbolic meaning are apparent to all. It is a tribute to the
inanity of current doctrinal categories that this complex social phenomenon had
to be redescribed as the unreasoning animus of particular individuals and
groups before the law could provide any remedy.
In short, many of the struggles that define America's "culture wars"-of
which Romer is only one example-are really battles over social status and
social structure. The combatants are fighting over whether an existing form of
social stratification will prevail or be transformed, whether an older social
hierarchy will be problematized or perpetuated. These Kulturkampfs are a
special kind of group conflict-a group conflict whose prize is social status.
Justice Scalia thought that Amendment 2 was insulated from constitutional
scrutiny if it reflected a majority's desire to assert (or reassert) its moral
values. But Scalia was wrong to think that phrasing the matter in this way is
determinative. The real question is whether state power has been harnessed to
maintain or perpetuate an unjust hierarchy of social status. The fact that moral
values are invoked does not dispose of the question. Status hierarchies are
often preserved by appeals to morality. Assertions about what is moral and
immoral, normal and deviant, honorable and dishonorable are not smokescreens
for illicit motivation, but the very fabric of a system of social domination.
For these reasons, the Constitution cannot always be neutral in cultural
struggles. It places itself on the side of the values of some groups and in
opposition to the values of others, even (and especially) if the grounds of
dispute include disagreements about religion, custom, tradition, or morality.
The Constitution is driven by a vision of democracy, but this democratic vision
is more than a formal commitment to majority rule. It is a commitment to a
democratic culture: one devoted to the dismantling of unjust hierarchies of
social status and the gradual realization of social equality for all citizens.
Part II of this Essay explains the theory of status groups and status
hierarchies. It shows how these phenomena produce group conflicts and
cultural struggles over moral vision. Part III argues that many clauses of the
Constitution-including many predating the Bill of Rights and the
Reconstruction Amendments-are concerned with dismantling unjust social
hierarchies of status and realizing a democratic culture. This is true even
though these same clauses also serve many other independent functions, and
even though the original Constitution was itself partly an attempt to stem the
tides of America's egalitarian social revolution. Part IV is a brief conclusion
that describes how the essays in this Symposium connect to the problem of
status conflict.
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II. GROUP CONFLICT AND THE ECONOMY OF STATUS
A. Status Groups and Status Hierarchy
To understand the relationship between the Constitution and group conflict,
one must understand how and why cultural struggles arise. Democracies
always involve struggles between groups. Interest groups contend over wealth
and political power. Yet what is distinctive about what I am calling cultural
struggles-like those over homosexual rights, school prayer, gun control, and
educational policy-is that they prominently feature conflicts over social status.
Put another way, cultural struggles are group conflicts where social status and
associated symbolic benefits are an indispensable and central bone of
contention and a crucial part of the prize sought.'9 In describing how these
cultural struggles arise, I want to introduce five key ideas: status group, status
hierarchy, status competition, status anxiety, and status nostalgia.
Social status is the degree of prestige and honor that individuals or groups
enjoy.20 This prestige involves the approval, respect, admiration, or positive
qualities imputed to a person or group. Lower social status confers and imputes
corresponding disapproval and negative qualities. Although individuals may
have different degrees of status within a single group, they also have status
because they are members of a group.2' One can have higher or lower status,
for example, because one is an immigrant, a woman, or a member of "the
upper crust." Critical race scholars have repeatedly noted that white Americans
have certain status privileges conferred on them merely by being white.2'
19. Because social conflict is often overdetcrmined, there is no reason to believe in a stict opposition
between cultural struggles and other interest group conflicts. To take only one example, opposition to gun
control may be financed by the arms industry in addition to being an issue of symbolic politics Yet it also
seems clear that gun manufacturers do not exhaust the sources of opposition to gun control. indeed. gun
manufacturers may find it much more in their interests to play up the cultural associations of gun
ownership.
20. See, e.g., RICHARD L. ABEL, SPEAKING RESPECT. RESPECTING SPEECH. at 111-24 (forthcoming
1997); JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE AmhiRICAN T-M,1PERANCE
MOVEMENT 14-15 (2d ed. 1986); BRYAN S. TURNER. STATUS 6-7 (1988) The original definition of status
comes from Weber:. a conception of "what is correct and proper and, above all, of what affects the
individual's sense of honor and dignity." I MAX WEBER. ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 391 (Guenther Roth &
Claus Wittich eds., U. of Cal. Press 1978) (4th ed. 1956) (describing notion of ethnic honor). see also 2
id. at 932 (defining status situation as "every typical component of the life of men that is determined by
a specific, positive or negative, social estimation of honor").
21. In recent years, economists have produced models of status competition both within groups. see.
e.g., ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST I-OR STATUS
(1985), and between groups, see, e.g., Richard H. McAdams. Cooperation and Conflict- 77ie Economics
of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L REV 1003. 1029 (1995) (arguing that
intergroup conflicts arise from mechanisms designed to resolve intragroup conflicts for status)
22. See, e.g., PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 124 (1991). Derrck Bell.
Xerces and the Affirmative Action Mystique, 57 GEO. WASH L REv 1595, 1602. 1608 (1989). Cheryl I
Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707. 1714 (1993). see also Alex M Johnson. Jr. Hot
Race and Poverty Intersect to Prevent Integration: Destabilzing Race a5 a Vehjcle to Integrate
Neighborhoods, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1595, 1636-48 (1995)
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Accordingly, a tradition of sociology beginning with Max Weber analyzes
social structure in terms of status groups, which demand and command
different degrees of respect and esteem in society." Weber's idea of status
groups is usually distinguished from Marx's idea of economic class."
Members of an economic class share a common economic interest because of
their common position in the structure of economic relations. They are people
who are subject to market forces in essentially the same way. Status groups,
on the other hand, do not have to contain members of the same economic
class. They are organized around common styles of life and common senses
of honor, prestige, or moral rectitude. Their members' common interest is in
defending and increasing the prestige of their group, their common ideals, or
their common styles of life72 There can be and often are significant overlaps
between status identity and economic class.26 Yet status groups can also be
organized around religious and ethnic identities that cut across lines of
economic class, and both class and status can serve as distinctive methods of
social stratification.27
23. See, e.g., 1 WEBER, supra note 20, at 305-06; 2 id. at 932-39; TURNER, supra note 20, at 6. Later
sociologists have developed the idea of status groups in different ways. Pierre Bourdieu has emphasized
the role of patterns of cultural consumption in social stratification. See PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION:
A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGEMENT OF TASTE (Richard Nice trans., Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.
1984) (1979). And there are many affinities between Weber's definition of status as lifestyle and Thorstein
Veblen's earlier theory of consumption as a cultural marker. See THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE
LEISURE CLASS (London, MacMillan 1899).
Sociologists sometimes make a further distinction between status communities and status blocs. Status
communities are groups of individuals defined by a relatively long-lasting set of common characteristics
like language, religion, ethnicity, culture, locality, and occupation. Status blocs are associations, defined
by their members' common characteristics, that come together to organize politically or socially for a
limited time. Members of status communities can form status blocs (for example, blacks can form advocacy
organizations like the NAACP), but they do not have to. An example of a status bloc not based on a status
community would be a consumer protection group or an organization to promote the interests of single
mothers. See TURNER, supra note 20, at 13 ("[Sltatus [blocs] come together for rather limited and possibly
short-term political or social objectives, while status communities tend to be long.enduring,
multidimensional, complex, primary groups."); cf. GUSFIELD, supra note 20, at 21 (noting related distinction
between status communities such as religions and status collectivities such as generations). My major
concern in this Essay is with status communities. I am interested in status blocs only to the extent that
status communities participate in social movements and form status blocs for this purpose.
24. See GUSFIELD, supra note 20, at 14-15; TURNER, supra note 20, at 8, 45-46.
25. See GUSFIELD, supra note 20, at 16, 18. Note that one's "style of life" can range from one's
religion to one's speech patterns; from one's family arrangements to one's favorite foods; from one's
clothing preferences to one's sexual preferences; from one's musical choices to one's choice of heros and
villains. There is an almost limitless array of behaviors that can become associated with a group and
symbolic of its status. That is one reason why racial distinctions, for example, can be coded around so
many different aspects of cultural life-for example, whether one watches Friends or Moesha. Cf I
WEBER, supra note 20, at 391 ("[T]he belief in ethnic affinity has at all times been affected by outward
differences in clothes, in the style of housing, food and eating habits .... ).
26. As Frank Parkin has suggested, over time the defenders of the Marxist and the Weberian
approaches to social stratification have begun to sound more and more alike. See FRANK PARKIN, MARXISM
AND CLASS THEORY: A BOURGEOIS CRITIQUE 25 (1979).
27. See GUSFIELD, supra note 20, at 14-15; TURNER, supra note 20, at 13-14, 26-28; 1 WEBER, supra
note 20, at 302-06; 2 id. at 926-27.
The debate between Marx and Weber concerns whether, in the long term, status hierarchies will
survive as a major form of social inequality in modern societies. See TURNER, supra note 20, at 1-2,45-50.
Marx believed that capitalism and markets would ultimately be the primary mechanism of social
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In many societies, status hierarchies emerge between groups with
distinctive identities or styles of life. The most obvious example of a status
hierarchy is a system of social caste; but status hierarchies can be much less
rigid and even quite fluid. Status hierarchies differ from mere separation of
groups, where the members of each group hold the other in mutual disdain. As
Weber noted, "the caste structure transforms the horizontal and unconnected
coexistences of ethnically segregated groups into a vertical social system of
super- and subordination." 28 In other words, a status hierarchy is sustained by
a system of social meanings in which one group receives relatively positive
associations and another correspondingly negative associations. As a result,
their identities are not freestanding: The identity of one is defined in part by
its relationship to the identity of the other, and a change in the meanings
attributed to one will affect not only its own social identity, but the identity of
the other group. In a hierarchy with many status groups, there can be many
different ways of differentiating the various groups and their respective
lifestyles, and hence the system of social meanings (and the results of changes
in social meanings) can be quite complex.
There is no necessary limitation on what characteristics can serve to
distinguish status groups in a status hierarchy. They can be mutable or
immutable, physical or ideological, matters of behavior or matters of
appearance. The most familiar ones in the United States are organized along
lines of race, sex, religion, immigrant status, and ethnicity.29 Conversely, not
every distinguishing trait or characteristic corresponds to a status group in a
status hierarchy. The number of traits that might be used to distinguish human
beings is limitless, but the organization of a status hierarchy is a result of a
particular history of social stratification and subordination. The question is not
whether identifying traits exist that might distinguish people, but whether
society has organized itself into a system of super- and subordination based on
those traits. The issue is social stratification based on traits, not the nature of
the traits themselves.
Thus, what constitutional lawyers call "immutability" is neither a necessary
nor a sufficient criterion for a status group. The question is whether the trait
stratification. He was not alone in this view. Tonnies and Maine had both suggested that free exchange in
markets undermines community norms and status relationships See ABEL. supra note 20. at 111-35-36, SIR
HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 100 (1917) (movement from status to contract). F"RMnNAND
TONNIES, COMMUNITY AND ASSOCIATION (Charles P. Loomis trans. Roudedge & Kegan Paul Lid 1957)
(1887) (movement from community to society). Weber. by contrast, insisted that status distinctions and
status conflicts would remain in capitalist and socialist societies See TURNER. supra note 20. at 2 The
twentieth century has seen, if anything, ever-increasing vaneties of religious conflict. nationalist assertion.
ethnic tension, and other struggles over status, both in the Third World and in the Vest See ABEL. supra
note 20, at I1-36-37.
28. 2 WEBER, supra note 20, at 934.
29. There are also "less explicit groupings, such as 'the old aristocracy." 'the nouveau nche.' and 'the
lumpenproletariat,"' which invoke "the subtle interrelation" of status and economic class GUsi-1ELD. supra
note 20, at 14.
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can be endowed with sufficient cultural meaning to support a system of social
stratification. Religious identity can serve this function even though religions
proselytize and gain new converts. The point is not what the trait is, but what
it can be made to mean in opposition to other traits.
Obviously, a system of subordination cannot be stable if it is too easy to
exit from the criteria of subordinate status. That is why biological traits can be
such useful markers of cultural differentiation. The advantage of immutability
lies in its guarantee of stability-it helps ensure that social hierarchy can be
reproduced effectively. Yet a trait does not have to be biologically based for
group membership to be relatively stable over time.
Conversely, even biological traits like skin color can allow for the exit of
one's children (through miscegenation), and hence so-called immutable criteria
like race may have to be buttressed or even constituted by legal or cultural
rules. Thus the Jim Crow regime featured cultural and legal prohibitions on
interracial marriage (if not interracial sex) and elaborate rules of hypodescent
to define who was white and black given the inevitability of racial mixing.3"
Groups lower in a status hierarchy may respond to their lower status by
developing a compensatory sense of esteem in their own ways of living,
condemning the lifestyles of higher status groups as immoral or inauthentic,
or attempting to turn their lower status into a point of pride through irony.
Weber believed that Jewish pride in being a "chosen people" was in part a
compensation for the experience of being social pariahs.3' Working-class
culture has found innumerable ways to express resentment and disapproval of
upper-class manners; blacks, homosexuals, and other lower status groups have
often used derogatory epithets and stereotypes ironically and subversively,
B. Legal and Sociological Status Contrasted
The idea of "status groups" may be confusing at first because lawyers have
their own concept of "status" which is used in a number of legal contexts and
forms the basis for many important doctrines. For example, the famous case
of Robinson v. California32 held that mere status could not be the basis of
criminal punishment. However, the legal and sociological concepts are
importantly different. In law, status is generally a characteristic of an
individual that has some legal consequences. Examples are being a servant, a
woman, or a minor. Sometimes legal status refers to a characteristic wholly
created by law, such as being a Social Security recipient. Sometimes it refers
30. See F. JAMES DAVIS, WHO Is BLACK?: ONE NATION'S DEFINITION 4-5, 8-11, 54-66, 77-79,
113-17, 139 (1991); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind", 44 STAN. L. REV, I,
23-24 (1991); Harris, supra note 22, at 1738.
31. See 2 WEBER, supra note 20, at 933-34.
32. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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to the legal results of previous action that has legal consequences, such as
being someone's spouse, an immigrant, or a felon.
Sociological status differs in three important ways. First, lawyers usually
understand legal status as a feature of individuals and their relationships to the
law (including their legal relationships to other individuals). By contrast, the
theory of status groups is concerned about social structure: It is concerned with
competition and hierarchy among social collectivities.
Second, sociological status is usually tied to a system of social hierarchy
or a system of comparative social evaluation. By contrast, legal status-at least
in modem times-is primarily concerned with legal meanings and legal
consequences. To be sure, in different times and places, legal status categories
like master and slave or husband and wife have helped support and even
constitute systems of social hierarchy. That is only one of the ways in which
legal form plays an important role in the structure of social relations. But with
modernization, legal status has increasingly been divorced from the task of
directly mapping or constituting social status categories.13 Nineteenth-century
concepts like "pauper" or "servant," for example, have increasingly been
replaced by twentieth-century concepts like "AFDC recipient" or "part-time
employee" as defined by particular statutory schemes.
Third, the legal concept of status is often distinguished from conduct.
Thus, in Robinson the Court argued that one could not punish a person for
being a heroin addict because being an addict was a preexisting status, not
current conduct.34 However, sociological status groups are differentiated by
many different cultural markers, including speech, patterns of behavior, tastes,
and styles of life.35 It includes both what the law would call "status" and
"conduct." The esteem that one holds in society (including both positive and
negative associations) is tied to how one dresses, how one prays, the kinds of
goods one purchases and consumes, and so on. Discrimination against African
Americans is usually based on negative judgments not about skin color, but
about dress, speech, bodily movements, consumption patterns, etc. When
whites make racist jokes about blacks' speech, dress, or mannerisms, for
example, they engage in demeaning stereotypes about behavior. Status-based
discrimination in the sociological sense is discrimination with respect to all of
the cultural markers-including "conduct"-that distinguish groups or are
otherwise associated with them.
Although the legal status of individuals and the sociological status of
groups are distinct concepts, law often directly reflects social status or helps
preserve status markers. Sometimes law helps constitute hierarchies of social
status directly. Examples are nineteenth-century doctrines regarding slaves, Jim
33. Indeed, laws invoking categones that directly relcr to status groups like vomcn or Afncan
Americans are now more likely to be understood as de jure discrimination
34. See 370 U.S. at 667.
35. See I WEBER, supra note 20, at 391.
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Crow laws, laws against miscegenation, and rules about the comparative
political and property rights of men and women. In the nineteenth century in
particular, the criteria of citizenship and the distribution of civil and political
rights often directly mapped or even helped define and constitute differences
in social status.
Legal reforms (like the abolition of slavery) may withdraw direct legal
support for categories of social status, often in the hope of dismantling status
hierarchies. Even so, the law usually continues to support social stratification
in other ways. Examples are the use of privacy doctrine in family law, or the
use of colorblindness in equal protection law.36 Thus, status hierarchies can
gain the support of legal norms either directly or indirectly. Legal categories
can map status distinctions and even help constitute them (as in the case of
slavery). On the other hand, status hierarchies can manipulate or work around
other kinds of legal distinctions to reproduce themselves in ever new forms.37
C. Status Groups and Symbolic Capital
Status groups compete not only for material resources, but for prestige and
honor. Members of status groups often fight about things that seem merely
symbolic, including flags, the placement and design of monuments, and the
presence and content of prayers at civic ceremonies.38 Whites and blacks fight
over whether to install a statue of Arthur Ashe among a group of Confederate
heros, or whether to remove a Confederate flag from the state capitol.39
Groups often fight over relatively minor changes in statutory provisions that
often will have little effect on the actual practices of law enforcement.4"
36. See, e.g., Reva Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE
L.J. 2117 (1996). Siegel argues that law's relationship to status hierarchies changes over time as status
hierarchies become "modernized." Modernization usually involves a movement from direct legal
constitution of status hierarchy-as in the case of slavery or the definition of women's rights-to legal
categories that seem irrelevant or even hostile to status distinctions but which actively perpetuate them in
other ways. See id. at 2174-78. Thus, although legal and social status are analytically distinct categories,
they have often been intertwined in historical practice. Legal categories like "slave" or "master and servant"
were not only legal distinctions, but helped support a system of social hierarchy. We only see the relation
between legal and social status differently now because of modernization. See id. at 2178-88.
37. On this phenomenon, see id. at 2178-87; Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects:
The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 1997).
38. Richard Abel's recent work on freedom of speech is based on the theory of status conflict and is
filled with many helpful examples of the phenomenon. See ABEL, supra note 20; RICHARD ABEL, SPEECH
& RESPECT (1994). Sanford Levinson's recent writings on public monuments and government-sponsored
speech also contain many useful examples of symbolic conflicts over status. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson,
Allocating Honor and Acting Honorably: Some Reflections Provoked by the Cardozo Conference on
Slavery, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 1969 (1996); Sanford Levinson, The Tutelary State, "Censorship,"
"Silencing, " and the "Practices of Cultural Regulation", in CENSORSHIP AND SILENCING: PRACTICES OF
CULTURAL REGULATION (Robert Post ed., forthcoming 1998); Sanford Levinson, They Whisper: Reflections
on Flags, Monuments, and State Holidays, and the Construction of Social Meaning in a Multicultural
Society, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1079 (1995) [hereinafter Levinson, They Whisper].
39. See ABEL, supra note 20, at IV-44-45; Levinson, They Whisper, supra note 38.
40. See, e.g., MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC UsES OF POLITICS 36-43 (1964) (discussing
symbolic use of antitrust laws and other forms of economic regulation).
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These symbolic struggles are forms of status competition."' Status
competition occurs in many different forms because one's status can be
diminished or augmented in many different ways. For example, people may
experience a loss of status because of the way others treat them in day-to-day
encounters. 2 However, because status is defined and measured in symbolic
terms, direct interaction is not always necessary. People can experience threats
to their status simply by watching or even hearing about conduct that is not
specifically directed at them individually but that reflects on their status group.
For example, even if an African American has never walked past the South
Carolina capitol, she might be very upset to know that the Confederate battle
flag flies there. Even if a religious parent never watches television sitcoms
with gay characters, she might be very concerned about their symbolic
approval of a gay lifestyle. Many Muslims were deeply hurt by the publication
of The Satanic Verses even though they had no intention of ever reading the
book. The mere existence of an offending monument, television program, or
book, can produce a felt loss in status and esteem for groups and for their
idealized styles of life. 3 Groups who fear a loss of status, either due to
competition from other groups or general social and economic changes,
experience status anxiety; often this leads them to try to reassert their status
through new forms of status competition."
One should not assume that symbolic struggles between status groups are
"merely" symbolic. Much politics is fought over the control of symbols
because these symbols are markers of social status, and social status is itself
a valuable good. Status includes social approval, respect, and admiration for
one's self and one's style of life; these attitudes are largely demonstrated and
received through symbolic activity. Hence the visible signs of increased status
are hotly contested by competing groups, and the contestants often look closely
for any signs of slights or disrespect, whether intended or unintended."
Symbolic conflict is not "just" symbolic; it is the very currency of having and
41. See ABEL, supra note 20, at 111-23-24; ABEL, supra note 38, at 22-24 (describing controversies
over freedom of speech as examples of status competition).
42. The analogous phenomenon is Erving Goffman's conception of stigma, in which the individual
conveys information about himself through personal interaction See ERvING GOFI-.IAN. STIG.MA NOrl.s
ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 51-62 (1963)
43. See ABEL, supra note 38, at 4-22. Because symbolism is the currency of status hierarchy. the mass
media play an important role in the economy of status. First. the mass media widely disseminate social
meanings that reinforce status hierarchies. That is one reason why people arc concerned about stereotypes
in television and movies. Second, mass media can spread alternative social meanings that might subvert
existing hierarchies. An example would be sympathetic portrayals of homosexual characters Third. mass
media can amplify and expand the scope of symbolic conflicts by calling attention to local disputes and
putting them "in the face" of people widely dispersed geographically Recent controversies over graduation
prayers, the Confederate battle flag, and the teaching of "ebonics" (Black English) are all examples
44. See GUSFIELD, supra note 20, at 22-23 (describing examples of how loss ot prestige leads to
attempts to "cut down to size" newly rising classes). Gusfield attributes the rise of support for Prohibition
largely to "the sense of cultural change and prestige loss which accompanied both the defeat of the Populist
movement and the increased urbanization and immigration of the early twentieth century" Id at 102
45. See ABEL, supra note 20, at IV-1-8.
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maintaining higher or lower status. The ability to gain a symbolic victory is
itself evidence of the achievement or preservation of higher status, which is
proved by the symbolic trophy carried away.46
Groups often pursue status competition with amazing vehemence. They do
so for two reasons. First, dignity, honor, and moral approval are important to
most people both intrinsically and for the further advantages that they bring.
Status is not identical to wealth, political power, or other social goods, but it
is often correlated with them.47 It can help people attain other social goods,
and in any case it provides its own compensations. Higher status can confer
increased political power; it often reflects wealth and may help create it.
48
Status capital can be converted, though often imperfectly and unpredictably,
into other forms of capital and economic and social power. Not surprisingly,
conflicts for increased social status often overlap with struggles for other social
goods. Thus, status competition is a method of upward social mobility. It is a
means for groups that have previously held lower status to raise their social
esteem, and gain other potential advantages that higher status normally confers.
Conversely, it is a method for groups who enjoy higher status to preserve their
prerogatives.
Second, status competition is intense because status is a relative good. One
has more of it because others have correspondingly less. Status competition
tends to be zero-sum, at least in the short run. 9 More generally, it is non-
Paretian: One cannot increase the status of one group without decreasing the
status of another." High prestige is prestige over others and in distinction to
others. Increased respect for lower status groups means a corresponding loss
of respect for higher status groups because their identity has been constructed
around their greater prestige and the greater propriety of their ways of
living.5
46. See id. at 111-26; GUSFIELD, supra note 20, at 4, 21.
47. See ABEL, supra note 20, at 1I-27; BOURDIEU, supra note 23, at 125-43; Kevin Sack, Symbols
of Old South Feed a New Bitterness, N.Y. TI Fs, Feb. 8, 1997, at Al (quoting view of historian Charles
Reagan Wilson that disputes over southern flags are fights "about who has the power, really").
48. See ABEL, supra note 20, at I-27.
49. See id. at 111-28-29; McAdams, supra note 21, at 1030-31 (arguing that status competition is zero-
sum "when members of different [social] groups seek incompatible positions for their groups along some
common, observable, and reasonably objective dimension"); id. at 1076 (noting that where one social group
seeks superiority and the other seeks equality, "the struggle for social status is zero sum"); cf. Kenneth L.
Karst, Religious Freedom and Equal Citizenship: Reflections on Lukumi, 69 TUtL. L. REV. 335, 351 (1994)
("Status domination is a zero-sum game, and one group's achievement of dominance is matched by a
'status harm' to another group."). See generally KENNETH L. KARST, LAW'S PROMISE, LAW'S EXPRLESSION
(1993) (offering various examples of zero-sum games of status domination involving race, religion, and
gender).
50. A change in the economy of status might be non-Paretian without being zero-sum if members of
a superordinate group lose less in status than members of a subordinate group gain.
51. See GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 371-72 (1954). Giving different groups
equal status requires that high status groups lose status. Because status is valuable, the latter groups will
not easily surrender it. In other words, in the economy of status one cannot reproduce the mythical
Minnesota town of Lake Woebegone, where all the children are above average.
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Put another way, status competition tends to be zero-sum--or at least non-
Paretian-because the identities of the antagonistic groups are not independent
of each other. Social identities depend on social meanings-sets of positive
and negative associations-that compare and contrast social groups. An
increase of positive associations for one group changes its social identity, and
hence affects the social identity of groups superordinate to it. For example, in
a system of white supremacy, whites gain positive associations of honesty,
reliability, industry, intelligence, and morality in comparison to blacks. To
increase the status of blacks in society means that these positive associations
must be weakened or eliminated. Whites can no longer expect a certain set of
positive assumptions to be made about them simply because they are white.
The social meanings of whiteness and blackness are subtly altered, and the
social identities of individuals are thereby changed.
Indeed, one way of tracing the history of the successes and failures of
American civil rights law is to ask how much social superiority whites have
felt comfortable surrendering at any time while still retaining their superior
status. Justice Harlan makes this point inadvertently in his famous dissent in
Plessy v. Ferguson. 2  Immediately before his famous declaration of
colorblindness and his announcement that "[t]here is no caste ' 5 3 in the United
States, he notes that "[t]he white race deems itself to be the dominant race in
this country."5' 4 Whites, Harlan argues, are dominant "in prestige, in
achievements, in education, in wealth and in power,"55 and so they "will
continue to be for all time."56 Harlan sees no contradiction between these
claims and the anti-caste principle he is about to announce, for he does not
think that granting legal equality to blacks will destroy the social superiority
of whites. Harlan thinks that one can and must make a distinction between
legal equality and social equality, and that the granting of legal equality will
not eventually lead to social equality: Even if blacks can sit in railway
carriages with whites, the white race will continue to be the dominant race for
all time. Of course, the whole debate in Plessy is how much the white race can
afford to give up in terms of legal protection and still remain "the dominant
In the long run, a society can attempt to increase the size of the "'status pie" by increasing the number
of awards, prizes, and other markers of high status available in society If people care about different
metrics of esteem, their status competition may not be zero-sum and it may not even be non-Paretan See
McAdams, supra note 21, at 1031; Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences. 102 YALE LJ 1. 49-55
(1992). On the other hand, if awards and status are distributed too liberally, this tends to cheapen their
value.
A related strategy is to create many new and different kinds of status that are incommensurable or
difficult to compare. In this way each group can have its share of status markers, but the very at.ct hat new
forms of status are incommensurable with each other undermines the sense that one is better than others.
and therefore may be insufficient compensation.
52. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
53. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
54. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
55. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
56. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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race." Justices Brown and Harlan disagree on precisely this point.57 Yet
neither Justice is willing to surrender the social dominance of whites. They
simply represent two different takes on the management of that dominance. As
soon as whites fear that legal reforms have left them no longer "the dominant
race in the country," their backlash has been as ferocious as it has been
predictable.
Just as status is partly convertible into other social goods, these goods can
partly compensate individuals for changes in their status. One can increase an
individual's level of social comfort by giving that person political power, a
higher income, or greater social esteem. Increases in one dimension can
sometimes compensate, albeit imperfectly, for losses in another.58 Conversely,
losses to social esteem are probably felt most keenly by those who have less
compensation in other dimensions of social goods.
It is not surprising that the middle of the 1950s and most of the 1960s
witnessed both a significant breakdown in status hierarchies as well as
abundant prosperity in the United States, not simply for the rich, but more
importantly for the middle and working classes. Middle- and working-class
whites and males had the most to lose from a loss in their social status, but
increasing affluence partly compensated them for a change in their social
identities.
Yet such balm can spread only so far. For all of their affluence, the 1960s
hardly witnessed a complacent acceptance of changes in the social meanings
of race and gender. Moreover, status politics and status competition usually
intensify when economic growth slows, as it inevitably must. When the size
of the economic pie is no longer growing or is even shrinking, social groups
may return avidly to the zero-sum game of status politics. Tolerance is
replaced by suspicion, and cooperation is replaced by increased demands for
respect and esteem. 59 This fact has not gone unnoticed by politicians. The so-
57. Although nowhere directly stated, one senses that Justice Brown's majority opinion is deeply
concerned that granting blacks additional legal equality will inevitably lead to social equality through racial
mixing. That is why it is necessary for Brown to prevaricate and insist that feelings of inferiority produced
by segregation do not reflect social reality but are simply blacks' idiosyncratic construction of the matter.
See id. at 551. Justice Harlan can afford to be more honest in his racism because he is quite sure that civil
equality for blacks will not lead to their social equality-that granting blacks additional rights will not
significantly change the superior status of "the white race."
58. Consider, for example, the tradeoff that many federal judges make when they surrender a much
higher expected income for what is presumably greater political power and higher social prestige.
59. See ABEL, supra note 20, at 111-38; 2 WEBER, supra note 20, at 938. By contrast, Gusfield,
following Lipset, argued that class politics was heightened in times of economic downturns, while status
politics was heightened in times of economic prosperity. See GUSFIELD, supra note 20, at 16-17 (citing
Seymour Lipset, The Sources of the Radical Right, in THE NEW AMERICAN RIGHT 166 (Daniel Bell ed.,
1955)). A more plausible account distinguishes two different causes of status politics. The first is the
scapegoating that accompanies economic downturns, as noted above. A second kind of status politics can
occur during times of economic prosperity but the mechanism is more complicated: It occurs not because
of scapegoating by superordinate groups but because of self-assertion by subordinate groups. During times
of economic expansion, status hierarchies may loosen for two reasons. First, subordinate groups are
energized because they have more resources and can spend less of their time eking out a living. Second,
superordinate groups, enjoying the fruits of the same expansion, are partially compensated for changes in
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called wedge issues perfected by the Republican Party in the 1970s and 1980s
have often been based on appeals to status politics, whether organized around
race, religion, ethnicity, or gender.60
Moreover, a booming economy does not always distribute its benefits
equally. Even when the rich are doing well, working- and middle-class
Americans may not be. Restructuring may cost jobs and produce lower wages,
and thereby create economic insecurities leading to a renewed hunger for status
and respect. This hunger can lead to new rounds of status competition, and the
scapegoating of blacks, Hispanics, and immigrant groups.
61
D. Status Competition and the Clash of Moral Values
Because status groups are organized around contrasting styles of life, status
competition is often phrased in terms of moral approval or disapproval. The
preservation of the status of one's group is seen as the preservation of morality
itself or at the very least of a particularly upright way of life. As Joseph
Gusfield argued in his study of the Temperance movement, "[e]ach status
group operates with an image of correct behavior which it prizes and with a
contrast conception in the behavior of despised groups whose status is beneath
theirs."'62 The fight over temperance was expressed in distinctively moral
terms, with abstemious Protestants berating Catholics and immigrants for their
immoral ways.
Men who sought to defend traditional gender roles (in which women hold
lower status) have often done so on the grounds of preserving the family and
traditional moral values. Women who abandoned traditional female roles were
either themselves immoral or were unwittingly contributing to moral lassitude
and the destruction of the family. Symbolic politics often concerns issues of
moral reform through which status groups attempt to defend or enhance their
the status regime. This relaxation of status hierarchies in turn emboldens subordinate groups, who step up
their demands and attempt to accelerate the process of transformation. This self-assertion leads eventually
to status anxiety and backlash. Status conflict will be exacerbated still further if this backlash occurs as the
economy is slowing.
60. See THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL & MARY D. Et)SALL., CHAIN RI-ACTION (991) (describing history
of Republican Party's successful use of social, racial and other "'wedge" issues)
61. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Civil Rights and Imnugration: Challenges for the Latino Coniiunir>
in the Twenty-First Century, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 42, 60 & n.89 (1995). The situation is exacerbated because
these groups are, in turn, attempting to better their status at the same time Hence middle-class and
working-class whites may feel squeezed between two different social trends. Economic insecunty may also
lead to a resurgence of anti-Semitism-and not only among whites-because anti-Jewish stereotypes feed
into a sense of economic frustration. See ALLPORT, supra note 51. at 370-71
62. GUsFIELD, supra note 20, at 27. Gusfield borrows the term "contrast concepton" from the
literature on racial and cultural relations. "it describes the ways in which groups impute sigrificance to
differences between their behavior and that of other social groups " Id-
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social prestige and the prestige of their style of life. 63 Usually groups do so
at the expense of the prestige and esteem of the losers in the cultural
struggle.'M Stereotypes often play an important role in these moral conflicts.
White beliefs about black immorality and the bankruptcy of black culture have
surely affected struggles ranging from welfare policy to censorship of rap
music.
65
Because status competition is tied to competing conceptions of morality,
it is tempting to assume that moral discourse and moral condemnation in
cultural struggles are merely a cover for status competition. But this view is
mistaken. The word "morality" itself comes from the Latin mores, or modes
of life, and the two concepts remain deeply connected. Debates about morality
are not smokescreens for debates about status; rather, struggles over status are
struggles over what forms of life should be honored and receive general moral
approval. Debates about morality and moral approval are the medium through
which status competition is carried out, but the moral debates are no less
authentic for that reason.66
Similarly, status competition does not always involve animus or hatred
toward competing groups. Animus may be present, but only in extreme
situations. Members of status groups are equally likely to feel disgust, fear,
condescension, or pity for their opponents. Often one finds only a sincere
desire to preserve the moral approval of a way of life that a status group has
adopted or that it holds up as an unfulfilled ideal. Just as moral disapproval is
not simply a cover for status competition, a status group's attempt to maintain
a preferred status or a status hierarchy is no less real simply because hatred or
animus is absent.
63. See id. at 3.
64. See id.
65. The sources of racism are many and varied; racism is not simple moral disapproval of other races
or their ways of life. But an important part of racial attitudes treats race as a proxy for culture. It is
important to emphasize that even after whites accepted that blacks were not naturally inferior to them it
was possible for them to believe that blacks were culturally inferior. White disapproval of black culture as
ignorant and immoral is an important part of this belief.
66. Many debates over the relationship between law and morals-raising in one form or another the
question whether the law should "legislate morality"--are debates about ideals and idealized styles of life
connected with groups actively engaged in status competition. Prohibition is an obvious example, and
homosexual rights are another. Religious groups in particular have often sought to bolster their esteem and
reassert their importance to society through moral crusades about gambling, drinking, alcohol and drug use,
and sexuality. Conversely, the rebuttal that law should "stay out of morality" is often made by secularists
or opposing religious groups. Once again, the language of morality is not a smokescreen for invidious
motivation, but the way in which cultural struggle is carried out. Although not all debates over "legislating
morality" are linked to status competition, many important ones have had these links. Jurisprudential
debates about the proper relationship between law and morals are both interesting and important
philosophically, but often they are beside the point sociologically. Competing groups are after more than
jurisprudential correctness; they are after a vindication of their worldview and hence their felt esteem in
a larger polity that they believe gives them and their idealized styles of life less respect than they rightfully
deserve.
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E. The Paradox of Status Hierarchy
Status competition can occur between groups with comparatively equal
status in society, for example blacks and Hispanics, both of whom currently
enjoy less social status than non-Hispanic whites.67 However, the examples
I am most concerned with in this Essay are cultural struggles between higher
and lower status groups in a status hierarchy. Status hierarchies are kept in
place by a system of social meanings and the attribution of positive and
negative qualities. When this set of social meanings starts to weaken, so too
does the status hierarchy, and new forms of status competition become possible
between superordinate and subordinate groups. This movement from relatively
taken-for-granted status hierarchies to relatively contestable ones is an
important source of cultural struggles.
When status hierarchies are relatively rigid, higher status groups may treat
lower status groups with condescension and even affection. Gordon Wood tells
of upper-crust American colonial aristocrats who joked and ate with their
social inferiors and treated them affectionately like children.' These
aristocrats could afford to intermingle because they were confident that their
social status was unaffected by such encounters. Indeed, the very idea of
"condescension" toward one's social inferiors was viewed as a positive quality,
whereas in our more egalitarian times it is viewed as an insulting form of
snobbery.69
Yet the aristocracy's comparatively easy attitude toward poor and working-
class Americans changed significantly in the years after the Revolution, when
the boundaries between classes had begun to break down and republican zeal
had started to dismantle native aristocracies. 0 As the ideology of the
American Revolution succeeded in weakening social distinctions,
condescension gave way to fear and distrust.
This point can be generalized. As social hierarchies break down, they are
increasingly replaced by new forms of status competition. This leads to what
I shall call the paradox of status hierarchy: Societies with relatively rigid
67. Moreover, although status competition usually occurs between groups in a single society, it can
also occur across national boundaries. Abel gives as an example the controversy surrounding Salman
Rushdie's publication of The Satanic Verses. See ABEL, .upra note 38, at 11-22 Many Muslims-both in
Great Britain and around the world-felt that the book was blasphemous and an insult to the honor and
dignity of Islam. The most extreme form of disapproval, however, was the Iranian Ayatollah Khomeni's
farwa against Rushdie, calling upon the faithful to execute the author. See id. at 15 The fanta helped
precipitate an equally indignant reaction in Western Europe and the United States over the intolerance of
Islamic fundamentalism, coupled with a demand that Rushdies opponents recognizc and respect his atisuc
freedom. See id. at 15-18. The controversy over The Satanic Veres concemed both the comparative status
of Muslims and Christians in Great Britain (where Rushdte lived), and the comparative honor of Islam and
the non-Islamic West.
68. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICAUISM OF THE AM.RICAN REVOLUTION 41-42 (1991)
69. See 3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 682 (2d ed. 1989) (listing earlier, more positive defintion
as "affability to one's inferiors, with courteous disregard of difference of rank or position")
70. See WOOD, supra note 68, at 271-86.
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social roles and hierarchical orderings tend to appear relatively stable and
peaceful on the surface. Consensus seems to rule. The system of social
meanings that convey higher and lower status is reproduced effectively, and
without great effort. Higher status groups may treat lower status groups with
condescension and paternalism.
Yet as status hierarchies weaken, it takes considerably greater effort to
keep subordinate groups subordinate and inferior meanings inferior. Lower
status groups feel able to assert themselves and demand greater respect. Higher
status groups experience increasing fears that they will suffer a corresponding
loss of prestige in the non-Paretian world of social status. People certain of
their superior social status may treat their social inferiors with indulgence and
even paternal affection, but when the status barriers begin to break down, their
rhetoric turns to fear, anger, and hate. They can no longer afford the luxury of
condescension.
As Richard Abel has noted, dominant groups faced with upstart
competitors are likely to feel extremely threatened; they cling ever more
fiercely to their symbols of pride and prestige. Hence, "[e]ven if a subordinate
group asks only a minimum of respect, the dominant group rightly perceives
this as challenging its superiority. ' 71 The result can be not only ill will and
intemperate language, but mindless, recurring cycles of violence and mutual
recrimination. Both subordinate and superordinate groups may lash out at each
other, wielding the weapons of rhetoric, law, or brute force: the former to
demand new social prestige, the latter to reinforce and reproduce old
hierarchies of respect and social meaning.
The paradox of status is that intense social conflict between status groups
emerges not at the height of a system of social stratification but during its
decline. The more clear-cut and well-defined that status hierarchies are, the less
overt are the kinds of discontent and strife one may see. A regime in which
"everyone knows their place"-and does not even imagine it possible to alter
that place-can create the illusion, if not the reality, of a harmonious, well-
ordered society. Conversely, when the clarity of status hierarchies is breaking
down, when social meanings become contested, and when previously lower
groups begin to demand higher status and a greater share of respect, there is
likely to be great confusion, discord, strife, even violence. Yet this may not be
because a perfect harmony has been shattered, but because the chains of a
particularly egregious hierarchy have begun to be loosened. The halcyon "good
old days," by contrast, may have reflected the robustness of then-existing
social hierarchies and the rigidity of social stratification.
The most conflicted moments in American history may be the times when
old social meanings about status are dissolving and new ones are taking their
place. These are moments of heightened cultural struggle or Kulturkampf. To
71. ABEL, supra note 38, at 24.
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be sure, they are not necessarily Kulturkampfs in Bismarck's original sense.
These cultural struggles are the effect of social forces that have already begun
to change. They feature not only the new assertions of groups rising in status,
but the rearguard actions of an older order that is starting to pass away. Higher
status groups employ whatever muscle they can offer-whether cultural, legal,
or physical-to replenish their diminishing status capital and to put things back
the way they were.72 But often, perhaps usually, it is already too late. The
system of social meanings has changed, and all of us are carried along by its
powerful tides. Faced with dissensus, open conflict, and even violence, people
often harken back to the "good old days" when people were moral, social
expectations were preserved, social deviance was invisible, overt enforcement
of status norms was unnecessary, and everybody knew their place. I call this
phenomenon status nostalgia.73
F. Romer v. Evans as an Example of Status Competition
It is not difficult to see how Romer v. Evans fits into this analysis.
Amendment 2 was a shoring-up exercise, designed to reassert what had lately
come into question. The proponents of Amendment 2 attempted to reestablish
traditional values through legal declaration. They wanted to ensure that
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation was not put on the same level
of immorality as discrimination on the basis of gender or race. They wanted
a clear statement by the state of Colorado that it was not so reprehensible an
act to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. What was at stake in
Amendment 2 was a symbolic affirmation of the comparative value, prestige,
and morality of different styles of living, and of the different groups who
practiced those different styles of life.
The hierarchy of social meanings that granted superior prestige to
heterosexuality was not primarily based on animus toward homosexuals. It was
72. As discussed supra text accompanying notes 58-61, the loss of status may be most keenily felt by
members of high status groups who in other respects have low social status. Such people have the most
to lose from a decline in prestige in the one aspect of their identity that bestows higher status Therefore
their opposition may be the keenest.
73. A wonderful example of status nostalgia is captured in the lyncs to the theme song for Norman
Lear's All in the Family, sung by Archie Bunker and his wife Edith at the beginning ot each episode
Boy the way Glenn Miller played,
Songs that made the hit parade,
Guys like us we had it made,
Those were the days.
And you knew where you were then,
Girls were girls and men were men.
Mister we could use a man like Herbert Hoover again
Didn't need no welfare state,
Everybody pulled his weight,
Gee our old LaSalle ran great,
Those were the days!
All in the Family (CBS television broadcast, 1971-79)
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based on moral disapproval. It involved discrimination to be sure, but between
those morally more and less worthy. It was discrimination in the same way
that people discriminate between the honest and the dishonest. Morality and
social propriety are surely at stake in the debates over the legalization of
homosexuality and the social equality of homosexuals. Unfortunately, moral
discourse is often the most important way in which existing social hierarchies
are defended and maintained. The lower status of women, and of blacks, has
repeatedly been defended in terms of religious and moral values.74
Understanding the struggle in Romer as the result of status competition
also helps to explain two claims that may at first seem mystifying from the
perspective of advocates of gay rights. The first is the claim that protecting
homosexuals from discrimination offers them "special" rights. The second is
the claim that antidiscrimination ordinances place an official stamp of approval
on homosexuality and will destroy the traditional family. A related claim is
that the recognition of gay marriage will endorse homosexuality and make a
mockery of heterosexual marriage. These assertions should be understood in
their cultural context. They are reactions to the gradual change in the social
status of homosexuals, and in the social meanings of homosexuality and
heterosexuality.
An ongoing status regime relies on the continual reproduction of a set of
social meanings about what is normal and abnormal, moral and immoral,
prestigious and base, that provide a baseline of expectations about what is
happening in society and what things mean. In a cultural struggle or
Kulturkampf like that over gay rights, superordinate status groups are trying
to preserve this older baseline of social meanings and expectations from
gradually occurring changes.
Protecting homosexuals from discrimination is understood as a sign of
increased social status mirrored in new legal protections. Because status
competition is zero-sum, this increase in status necessarily occurs at the
expense of heterosexuals. From the perspective of the older baseline of social
meanings, it appears that homosexuals are being given something new that is
being taken away from heterosexuals. They are being given increased honor,
respect, and esteem, hence "special treatment." At the risk of trivializing the
phenomenon, it is somewhat like an older brother who resents the new toy
purchased for his younger sibling. Or more accurately, it is as if the toy were
taken from the older brother and given to the younger. Every change in the
semiotic status quo, no matter how unfair the previous baseline of social
meanings, may be seen as sending the message of favoritism and special
treatment. Any departure from a baseline that views homosexuality as deviant
74. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (justifying subordinate status of women
as "law of the Creator"). These hierarchies have also been defended by appeals to scientific rationality. See
STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 30-145 (1981).
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and immoral will be viewed by some members of the dominant status group
eager to retain their status as a movement toward treating homosexuality as
normal and morally appropriate.
In this zero-sum world, tolerance for homosexuals can be reconciled with
their lower social status only so long as this tolerance is given grudgingly and
without any social or moral approval of homosexuality. Tolerance that
demands moral acceptance of homosexuality, however, is in tension with the
existing baseline of social meanings and hence will be viewed as delibeiate
approval or advocacy of gay lifestyles. This baseline of expectations explains
the politics of the closet: Homosexuals who remain in the closet and act like
heterosexuals will be treated equally as long as they do not make an issue of
their homosexuality. To declare their homosexuality openly and then to
demand equal rights appears to assert that it is wrong to discriminate against
homosexuals because of their lifestyle, which in turn implies that perhaps
homosexuality is not so immoral after all. Because such overt demands disturb
the hierarchy of social meanings and the implicit moral superiority of
heterosexuality, they are viewed as "flaunting," and thus as presenting demands
for "special" treatment.
Similarly, gay marriages "threaten" or "make a mockery of' traditional
marriage because from the standpoint of the older baseline of social meanings
they send the message that gay marriage is "just as good as" heterosexual
marriage. Legal recognition of gay marriages, like antidiscrimination
legislation, is symbolic of a change in the status relationship between
heterosexuality and homosexuality, and thus appears to equate the morality of
one with the morality of the other. Because homosexuality is presumed
immoral under the older set of assumptions, gay marriages degrade
heterosexual marriage by comparison. From the standpoint of gay rights
opponents, it is as if one equated property with theft. Nothing could be more
damaging to the hierarchy of heterosexuality over homosexuality, and produce
a greater loss of status, than the symbolic statement that homosexual unions
are just as moral, just as normal, and deserve just as much social approval as
heterosexual marriages. Because legal recognition of gay marriage departs from
the symbolic status quo, it can be interpreted in precisely this way-as
"advocacy" of the gay lifestyle rather than a demand for equal treatment.
It is not accidental that the most vocal opponents of gay marriage and gay
rights have repeatedly raised the specter of children being taught in the public
schools that homosexuality is just as normal and morally appropriate as
heterosexuality.75 This is understood as a powerful argument against reform
precisely because it poses the question of a change in status relations in its
75. See, e.g., David Foster, ht Gay Rights Debate. Concent About Children 13 Never Far Asa'. L A
TIMES, June 6, 1993, at B3 (noting concerns among parents that teaching that homosexuality is normal will
lead more children to become homosexual).
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starkest form: It asks straights if they are really willing to accept fully equal
moral status with homosexuals. Opponents of gay rights assume that most
heterosexuals, no matter how tolerant, will not be willing to take that step;
once they understand what full social equality for homosexuals means they will
recoil in horror. The instincts of these gay rights opponents are entirely correct:
Few groups ever surrender the whole of their higher social status willingly.
G. The Role of Social Movements
Indeed, because status competition is zero-sum, higher status groups are
loath to surrender any of their status unless it conflicts with practical political
necessities or with other deeply held beliefs. Hence social movements like
abolitionism, the civil rights movement, the gay rights movement, and the
many incarnations of American feminism are vitally important in explaining
why superordinate groups eventually accept a redistribution of status.
Social movements are more than movements for legal reform. They are
movements for status disestablishment. Hence they are movements for changes
in social structure and changes in social meaning. The feminist movement in
America, for example, has not been simply about gaining legal rights for
women; it has also tried to change the day to day behavior and beliefs of both
men and women. Law plays an important role in this process, but it is only
one element.
Social movements attempt to create practical problems in maintaining
social order and social control. Social movements also attempt to change the
social meaning of subordination so that it eventually comes to conflict with
other deeply held beliefs about justice, equality, and fair play.76 A dual attack
on both practical interests and ideological commitments is often the best
strategy. A good example is the gradual change of heart that elites experienced
concerning southern segregation as a result of America's foreign policy
initiatives in the Cold War.77 Distinguishing the American way of life from
Communism caused many elites to become increasingly uncomfortable with
America's system of apartheid. This change in attitude by elites, and
particularly northern elites, probably helped buttress the fledgling civil rights
movement in the South in the 1950s.
Furthermore, social movements can often gain advantages by forming
alliances with more powerful groups. The early civil rights movement took
place against the backdrop of a more general assault on southern culture and
76. See, e.g., Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrencunent: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1359, 1368 (1988) (discussing role of
civil rights movement in remaking image of blacks in eyes of whites and undermining white views about
justice of status quo).
77. See, e.g., Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REiv. 61, 62
(1988).
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southern institutions by northern elites. Even before the Supreme Court finally
put its weight behind school desegregation in Green v. County School
Board8 it demanded an end to Bible readings and school prayer.7"
The present struggle over gay rights is also much more complicated than
a simple status conflict between the forces of social hierarchy and the righteous
armies of egalitarianism. Many different groups are usually involved in cultural
struggles, forming complicated sets of alliances. Struggles for equality are
often bound up with other struggles that are not so egalitarian. The civil rights
movement, for all of its moral authority, was allied with the drive by northern
managerial and technical elites to dominate and reshape the culture of southern
working-class whites. Moreover, different groups, each of whom is attempting
to rise in status, may be on different sides of a cultural struggle.
In like fashion, the current struggle over gay rights is more than a battle
between the Goliath of heterosexual America against the David of the gay
rights movement. Among the most vocal opponents of gay rights initiatives are
Christian conservatives, who are themselves struggling to increase their status
and respect vis-A-vis secular America."0 Conversely, the struggle for gay
rights may well be facilitated by the emergence of a new status regime that
features a rising economic class of professionals and information producers.
This new information or knowledge class earns its living through the
manipulation of symbols, the production and interpretation of information, and
the creation of objects of informational consumption through computers and
mass media. The new knowledge class is largely secular, and tends to be
liberal on so-called social issues. The rise of this class signals the increasing
economic and social downfall of non-symbol-manipulating, nonprofessional,
lesser-educated Americans. It was no accident, then, that Justice Scalia angrily
identified the result in Romer with the prejudices of "elites,"'" or that
Republicans ranging from Bob Dole to Pat Buchanan have made anti-elitist
appeals both to working-class Americans and religious conservatives. '2 Gay
78. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
79. On the strategy of northern elites in remaking the South. see L A Powe. Jr. Doaes Footnote Four
Describe?, 11 CONST. COMMENTARY 197, 212-14 (1994)
80. Christian conservatives are not a monolithic entity, and it is unclear whether the label constitutes
an independent status group, but it surely contains many status groups, including fundamentalist Chnsttans.
evangelical Protestants, and conservative Catholics. The latter groups have often been stereotyped and made
the butt of jokes. Nevertheless, they are by no means held in the same degree of contempt as homosexuals
It is not illegal for Christian conservatives to practice their religion, and they are protected from
discrimination by federal and state law. Few people in the United States regard being an evangelical
Christian as an immoral lifestyle choice. By contrast, homosexuals are still often condemned morally by
many segments of society and they are still subject to de jure discnmination in many areas of life
81. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620. 1629 (1996) (Scalia. I . dissenting)
82. See, e.g., Michael Barone, Hell No, 7heY Shouldn t Go- For Repubhcan Pat Buchanan, Bosnia
Is a Target of Opportuinty. U.S. NEws & WORLD REP.. Dec 1. 1995. at 50-51 (reporting Buchanan calls
for "building a national coalition that will defy the corporate and political elites and put our own people
and our own country first for a change"); Rita Beamish. Buchanan Accuses Republican Rivals of Stealing
His Agenda's Thunder, STAR-LEDGER (Newark), Sept. 18, 1995 (noting Republican presidential candidates'
appropriation of Buchanan's anti-elitist message); Robert J Dole. Text of the Republican Respoanse. WASg
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rights advocates will probably find this rising knowledge class among its most
hospitable allies, but it is unclear whether this new class is producing a more
just and egalitarian order of status.
The centrality of social movements to contemporary attacks on status
hierarchy shows the irony and the perversity of the categories courts have
traditionally used to describe groups deserving of special constitutional
protection. Courts often look to the "political powerlessness" of a group when
deciding whether to treat it as disadvantaged and classifications affecting it as
suspect.8 3 Yet legal elites-whether judicial or legislative-usually respond
to "disadvantaged" groups only after a social movement has demanded a
response. Ironically then, a status group must display some degree of political
power-whether at the ballot box or in the streets-before it can be considered
"politically powerless" and hence deserving of legal protection.84
The centrality of social movements in promoting social change reflects the
fact that law generally works most effectively in assisting the breakdown of
a system of social meanings that has already begun. Rarely can it dismantle a
status system on its own. The fact that members of status groups have
organized into social movements like feminism, civil rights, or gay rights is a
sign that social changes have already begun, that the social hierarchy has
started to become controversial and hence can no longer hide itself under the
camouflage of naturalness. Under these conditions, law can play an important,
albeit supporting, role. After all, it is unlikely that members of higher status
groups (who tend to dominate the legislatures and the judiciary) will even
recognize the possibility of a problem until a social movement appears on the
scene to demand increased status.
Thus, the ability of status groups to find supporters in the political process
tells us only that a status hierarchy has begun to break down and therefore that
its injustice has begun to become visible to increasing numbers of legal and
governmental elites; it does not tell us whether the group is deserving or
undeserving of legal protection. After all, African Americans have been the
beneficiaries of remedial legislation since the passage of the 1866 Civil Rights
POST, Jan. 24, 1996, at A15 (responding to President Clinton's State of the Union Address by accusing
Clinton of "shar[ing] a view of America held by our country's elites"). Attacks on elites are important parts
of the current culture wars, not only in the cases of gay rights, abortion, and school prayer, but also federal
funding for the arts. Ironically, members of political elites-for example, Pat Buchanan, Jesse Helms, and
George Wallace-usually represent lower status groups in public discourse. Even if they retain relatively
high individual status as a result of their privileged positions, they gain political power by representing the
status concerns and status resentment of others.
83. See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987); Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986); City
of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
686 n.17 (1973).
84. This phenomenon is related to the paradox of status hierarchy noted earlier. Robust status
hierarchies are less likely to be challenged and therefore have a greater appearance of stability. Only when
hierarchies begin to weaken are mass social movements able to form and gain strength. Indeed, social
movements are both cause and symptom, for as they grow they may accelerate the process of social
transformation.
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Act. Over the years, many legal elites (including African-American members
of those elites) have enlisted in the cause of racial equality. Yet this does not
mean that unjust racial hierarchy has been eliminated from the United States.
Indeed, groups that are truly politically powerless usually do not even appear
on the radar screen of legal decisionmakers-including courts-because the
status hierarchy is so robust that few in power even notice that there is a
problem.
Nevertheless, once a social movement has gained widespread recognition,
the law often expands its protection to other groups who may never have
organized into a social movement but whose situation is understood as
formally similar. Thus, the beneficiaries of Reconstruction were not only
blacks, but also Hispanics, Asian Americans, and other ethnic minorities. Even
though the Reconstruction Amendments were specifically designed to protect
blacks, courts soon applied them to prohibit all discrimination based on race
or national origin.85 Today Polish Americans are protected every bit as much
as African Americans even though the 1960s did not witness a Polish
American civil rights movement. The internal logic of legal regulation grants
rights to groups even without the creation of social movements, as long as
some other group judged sufficiently "similar" has trod before them.
In fact, a focus on "political powerlessness" may be not only irrelevant but
perverse: It plays into the hands of people who want to preserve status
hierarchies. The very existence of a nascent social movement to break down
unjust status hierarchies is evidence that the group is not politically powerless.
It is evidence that the group is, in contemporary language, a powerful special
interest group, or in public choice terms, a rent-seeking minority seeking to
impose costs on the rest of society. It is no accident, therefore, that opponents
of homosexual rights complain loudly about the power of the "homosexual
lobby," or that Justice Scalia thinks it important to note that homosexuals are
a highly organized and politically influential group.'
Scalia's impression of the massive political might of homosexuals may be
due to their relatively recent self-assertion in the face of a declining, albeit still
powerful, status hierarchy. Our sense of political clout depends, like so much
else, on background assumptions of what is normal and appropriate. All groups
tend to look more powerful once a boot has been lifted off their neck. If one
never noticed the boot (or its impropriety) in the first place, the group may
now look positively arrogant.
The more general lesson that we should draw is one about the sociology
of legal knowledge-about lawyers' use of doctrinal categories to judge the
nature of the political and social system and to measure and remedy group
85. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368-69 (1886) (applying Fourtecnth Amendment
to Chinese resident alien); Slaughter-House Cases. 83 U.S. 36. 71-72 (1872) (rcrognizing Reconstrution
Amendments not limited to blacks).
86. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (Scalia. J . dissenting)
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disadvantage. Legal elites must be self-critical because their judgments are
conditioned by their participation in the system they are trying to judge. The
lawyer's conception of "suspect classification," for example, does not refer so
much to a fact about social hierarchy as to the consciousness of legal elites in
recognizing the existence and the unjustness of social hierarchy as the result
of successful social movements. Few legal elites thought sexual orientation
could be a suspect classification until social movements began to change their
political imaginations.87 Law always comes upon social inequities in medias
res; lawyers only see the problem because some group has already imagined
and acted upon the promise of a better world.
III. THE CONSTITUTION AND STATUS HIERARCHIES
A. The Soul of the Constitution
If status hierarchy and status competition are pervasive and ubiquitous
features of even democratic societies, does the Constitution have anything to
say about them? Justice Scalia's dissent in Romer suggests one view: Because
cultural struggles are cultural, they are the subject of everyday political
struggle. The evolution of status relations should be left to the vicissitudes of
cultural change and democratic struggle. Indeed, precisely because democracies
87. In some ways, the relation of Romer to Bowers is a perfect example of this phenomenon. Several
years ago, Cass Sunstein tried to deal with Bowers by suggesting that while the Due Process Clause
properly looks to history and tradition, the Equal Protection Clause need not. See Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual
Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection,
55 U. CHti. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (1988). This is a wonderful example of lawyers' continual belief in the
ability of legal categories to understand the social world: Like the test of "political powerlessness," it is
an attempt-through doctrine-to articulate a social phenomenon that shapes the lawyer's very
understanding of what doctrine means!
The result in Bowers is best explained not by the differing legal functions of the two Clauses, but at
what point in the history of a declining status hierarchy each Clause is most likely to get invoked. When
a status hierarchy is still relatively unproblematic, when it appears natural and normal, defenders of the
hierarchy can make more or less unproblematic appeals to the moral values that support the hierarchy. As
a result, the conflict is more likely to be understood as one between morality and claims of individual
liberty. One looks to "tradition" to settle the issue because tradition is the crystallization of those moral
views that reflect and support those status hierarchies that are still relatively unproblematized. Any liberty
claim must somehow be made consistent with an interpretation of this tradition. One way to do this Is to
argue that law should not attempt to enforce "morality"; a second is to claim that the tradition is flexible,
or indeterminate; a third is to claim that there are differing views about morality and the law should not
impose a particular version.
Hence, at the beginnings of the contemporary (post-1960s) women's movement, abortion rights were
more likely to be understood and accepted (by most men if not by most women) as questions of individual
liberty than as questions of the equality of status groups. This conceptualization is reflected in the structure
of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). It also helps that the Court that wrote this opinion consisted of
middle- to older-aged men. An equality-based interpretation of abortion rights surely existed in 1972 when
Roe was argued, but it was not sufficiently mainstream to appeal to the members of the Supreme Court.
However, when a status hierarchy increasingly begins to decline, the struggle between social groups
emerges more clearly, and all sides see the conflict more clearly as one of equality. Tradition can no longer
play the same role as it did before. It has become problematized in the minds of increasing numbers of
legal elites, and hence it must be selectively invoked if it is invoked at all.
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allow majorities to rule, and because majorities tend to be of lower status than
elite groups, democracy will, over time, be the greatest foe of status hierarchies
and status inequalities. Gradually, the democratic process and the levelling
features of democratic culture will destroy systems of social meaning that
unjustly privilege some groups over others. Democracy will eventually
extirpate privilege and level caste. Obviously, the Constitution must intervene
where there is a "'bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group.""
Absent a clear showing of such animus, however, the Constitution's role is
merely to ensure that the political system does not take sides in the ongoing
struggle between status groups in the zero-sum game of status competition.
Too strong a version of this call for neutrality can surely be reduced to an
absurdity. Hierarchies of social status are often intertwined with and supported
by distinctions of legal status. Status hierarchies have been used to define who
can be a citizen, and who among the citizenry can enjoy the privileges of self-
governance. The vast majority of African Americans were once held in slavery
with no political rights, and even after emancipation they were effectively
denied suffrage and political equality. Women were recognized as citizens
from the beginnings of the republic but were for many years denied the right
to vote as well as many other political rights. All of these restrictions occurred
with the blessing of democratic majorities, at least as defined by existing law.
The self-reinforcing character of social status distinctions mapped onto law
undermines the assumption that democracies can be expected to dismantle
unjust status hierarchies. Yet these examples do not refute a general policy of
constitutional neutrality in cultural struggles. Rather, they might simply suggest
that the Constitution demands that status hierarchies must be dismantled only
to the extent that they deny citizens equal rights to vote and participate in the
democratic process.89
But the Constitution does more than simply provide fair ground rules for
cultural struggle. It also actively intervenes in some status hierarchies and
requires that they be dismantled, or at the very least, that the support of law
be withdrawn from them. The Constitution has an egalitarian demand, a
demand which is more than a demand for equality of civil rights, and more
than a demand for equality of political rights. It is a demand for equality of
social status, a demand that exists even though it cannot be achieved by legal
88. Roner, 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (quoting Department of Agnc v Moreno. 413 U S 528. 534 (1973))
89. In fact, our largely libertarian docines of free speech seem to embrace the idea of tough neutrality
in cultural struggles. Status inequality is reproduced through systems of cultural meaning, but much cultural
meaning is created, reproduced, and transmitted through expression The First Amendment guarantees the
existence of a sphere of public discourse in which different status groups can attempt to shape and control
their own cultural associations and the cultural associations of groups with which they compete No group
is given the right to a monopoly over the cultural meanings associated with it. it must win the battle over
cultural meaning through its own effective use of speech. For an argument about government regulation
of racist speech along these lines, see Robert C. Post. Racist Speech. Demtiocrac. and the First Amendment.
32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 267 (1991).
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means alone. This egalitarian demand is what connects the Constitution to our
founding document, the Declaration of Independence. It is the deep meaning
of the American political experience. It is the soul of our Constitution.
Our constitutional tradition has understood itself as responding to this
demand, albeit haltingly and defectively. In his Gettysburg Address, Abraham
Lincoln noted that although our Constitution was "conceived in liberty," it was
dedicated to a proposition-the proposition that all human beings are created
equal.90 The actual words of the Declaration, of course, are that all "men" are
created equal. That grammatical embarrassment, that sour note in the clarion
call for equality, is also part of the meaning of the egalitarian demand. For
whenever we attempt to articulate this demand, we always articulate it
imperfectly.
At the time the Declaration was written, few in the Continental Congress
understood the exclusion of women as an embarrassment, although more
perhaps understood and felt the embarrassment of slavery. Yet this
phenomenon of a document making a demand for equality, a demand that
undermines itself and embarrasses the document that states it-this self-
contradictory expression of an underlying ideal-is one of the central features
of our political predicament. It is an apt and ironic expression of the ongoing
and indeterminate demand for equality. The Constitution makes a distinction
between just and unjust status hierarchies. It places itself on the side of
dismantling the unjust ones. But it does not always tell us which ones are
which; and our first thoughts on the matter are often transformed through
further experience and reflection.
Individuals who enjoy high status do not want to surrender that status
easily. They may either fail to see their privileged position in a social
hierarchy, or, when called to their attention, think it entirely just. Precisely
because status capital is so precious a commodity, there is no end of ways in
which people can justify their social privileges to themselves. Yet the
egalitarian project of our Constitution requires us to engage in an ongoing
reflection on what forms of status hierarchy are just and unjust, and how best
to dismantle them given the always limited and imperfect tools at our disposal.
The oracle of the Declaration speaks in a hazy and unclear voice. Each of us
carries away something different from her words. Each generation must come
to understand what forms of social hierarchy still exist and the extent to which
they are unjust. Through this experience, we eventually come to understand
90. Abraham Lincoln, Address at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, in ABRAHAM LINCOLN, SPEECHES AND
WRrrINoS 1859-1865, at 536 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989). For an excellent discussion of Lincoln's
theory of the Declaration as expounding the deep meaning of the Constitution, see GARRY WILLS, LINCOLN
AT GETrYSBURO: THE WORDS THAT REMADE AMERICA 88-89, 101-08, 118-20, 130-33 (1992). Lincoln,
in turn, drew on an entire tradition of antebellum thought that accorded a special place to the Declaration
as representing a transcendent ideal that continually tests the Constitution and to which the American polity
aspires. See id. at 103-20.
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what we were always committed to. We will become what we in hindsight
always meant to become. This is an ongoing project of self-understanding and
self-governance. We Americans are not agreed on its contours today, and it is
certain that we will not be agreed on it a century from now. But the project
itself, the oracle, the demand, is the deepest meaning of the American political
experiment.9
Many features of the Constitution, both in its 1787 version and as later
amended, are concerned with dismantling unjust status hierarchies. I use the
term "concerned" advisedly, for the Framers and Ratifiers of the Constitution
lived long before Max Weber and they did not think in these particular
sociological terms. (Indeed, the discipline of sociology would not be invented
until the next century.) Yet one does not have to be a sociologist to understand
that society is full of cultural meanings of superiority and inferiority, that
groups exist in social hierarchies of relative status and prestige, and that some
of these hierarchies are unfair and unjust. Indeed, the generation that fought
the Revolutionary War understood all of these things. They had themselves
lived through and participated in a social transformation that dismantled an
older status regime: the American Revolution and its aftermath.
The American Revolution was not simply a political revolution; it was also
a social revolution. As Gordon Wood has described in a book aptly titled The
Radicalism of the American Revolution, the generation of 1776 consciously
attempted to break free from the aristocratic social structure they had inherited
from Great Britain.92 They hoped to create in its stead not only a republican
form of government but a new republican society, freed from the caste-like
system of nobility and royal honors. They hoped to substitute a natural
aristocracy of merit for the aristocracy of birth and social privilege. They
hoped, in short, to breed a new sort of person, a republican citizen, equal to
all and subordinate to none.
Although the revolutionary generation spoke in these broad phrases, their
actual commitment to equality was more limited. They wanted to rid
themselves of the bowing and the scraping, the snobbery and the undeserved
prestige of noble birth and royal prerogative. Yet they did not extend their
egalitarian social revolution to slaves, to women, to the poor, or to many other
social groups. They saw only certain features of the status hierarchies of their
day as worth fighting and dismantling. This is hardly surprising, for the leaders
of the Revolution were for the most part themselves privileged men. They
believed in a form of deference politics, in which the masses would and should
91. For a discussion of the political meaning of the Constitution in trms of the "project" of the
Declaration, see Mark Tushnct, The Constitution Outside the Courts (Oct- 26. 1996) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
92. See WOOD, supra note 68, at 240-43. 276
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defer to the "best" men.93 Yet within a few generations, this halfway house
between an older order and the new had largely broken down; deference
politics was itself viewed as a relic of aristocratic pretension.94
The revolutionary generation, and the Framers and Ratifiers of the
American Constitution, let loose an egalitarian revolution that went much
further than they imagined or with which they themselves would have been
comfortable. In the process of destroying the old order of nobility and
aristocracy, and creating a new republican man, they set free forces of
democratization that still carry us along today. But this is the fate of all great
revolutions and all great revolutionary ideas; they are always more powerful
than their progenitors. Often their original advocates seem in hindsight much
closer to the ideas they themselves tried to leave behind. The American hunger
for social equality has proved more lasting than any single generation's
interpretation of it.
B. The Constitution's Status-Disestablishing Clauses
When we look at the Constitution, we can see that many of its
elements--especially those in the 1787 Constitution-are designed to temper
mass participation and hinder full social equality. They preserve and reinforce
social inequalities even as they partially disassemble them; and the specter of
the slave system haunts many of the clauses of the original Constitution. Yet
what is more wonderful is that many other features of the Constitution seem
specifically concerned with dismantling hierarchies of social status, and
offering fair ground rules for the status competition that results. To be sure,
these different clauses of the Constitution deal with only some of the features
of status hierarchy, and often only fitfully at best; but that is because they are
designed for many other purposes as well.
The most obvious examples of status-dismantling clauses occur in the
Reconstruction Amendments, and particularly in the Thirteenth Amendment.
The Thirteenth Amendment at one stroke abolished an entire system of chattel
slavery, and called for the extirpation of its "badges and incidents., 95 Because
status inequality is more than legal distinction, the elimination of slavery
should have also included the elimination of the system of cultural meanings
93. See id. at 253-55 (explaining that Framers thought that officers of new federal government would
be "disinterested gentlemen" or "wise and virtuous elite"). On the phenomenon of "deference politics," both
in England and America, see EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 169-79, 248-49, 285-87, 305-06 (1988).
94. See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 68, at 298 (describing Federalists' view of themselves as "natural
gentry rulers of the society"); id. at 299-300 (noting that family connections and high birth gave way to
party loyalty as test of who should receive nominations and appointments). The republican vision was
quasi-aristocratic as well in its vision of the statesman who served the public without pay. This soon gave
way to the salaried officeholder. See id. at 293-94.
95. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
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that made slavery possible. Hence dismantling the badges and incidents of
slavery should also have included the full elimination of the system of white
supremacy that allowed generations of blacks to be subordinated to whites.
Here too, the generation that began a revolution was unwilling to fully carry
out its promises, and it has been left to us even today to redeem them.
The Fourteenth Amendment is another obvious example of a status
disestablishing amendment. The Dred Scott"' case had closely linked the
status hierarchy of white supremacy to legal status by holding that blacks could
not be citizens.97 Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment extended
citizenship to all persons born in the United States, thus demolishing the
linkage between citizenship and race. It states that: "All persons born or
naturalized in the United States ... are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside." 98 The citizenship clause is a second Declaration
of Independence, announcing that equal citizenship would henceforth be
available to all regardless of race or prior condition of servitude.
The Fourteenth Amendment was status-disestablishing in another important
way. Its framers believed that the Fourteenth Amendment abolished all forms
of so-called class legislation.99 The very idea of a prohibition on class
legislation seems puzzling to us today. In the modem world view, all
legislation divides individuals and groups into classes and hence could be
understood as a form of class legislation." Yet the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment had something more specific in mind. The concept of
class legislation had its sources in the Jacksonian era's distrust of governments
granting monopoly charters and other special privileges to the rich and
powerful.'" Class legislation in the Jacksonian sense was a government's
attempt to grant special favors to a specified class of citizens and hence elevate
them above others both symbolically and legally.'12 The Jacksonians'
96. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)
97. See id. at 404.
98. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
99. This expression is used in Senator Howard's famous speech on behalf of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. (1st Sess.) 2766 (1866) The framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment actually used many different phrases to desenbe the concept, including the ideas of "equality
before the law," a prohibition of "special privileges," and "'equal justice for rich and poor ahke " Se'e
WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUtICIAL Doc'TRIN
71-80 (1988). Whatever the language used, "[tlhe idea that laws should be gcneral and not tainted by
considerations of class or caste was widely recognized and accepted before the fourteenth amendment was
enacted." Mark G. Yudof, Equal Protection,. Class Legislaion. and Sex Discnuninaion" One Small Cheer
for Mr Herbert Spencer's Social Statics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1366, 1376 (1990)
100. See NELSON, supra note 99, at 138; Yudof. supra note 99, at 1378-82
101. See NELSON, supra note 99, at 14-17; Michael Les Benedict. Laisse-Faire and Liberty A
Reevaluation of rte Meaning and Originis of Latssez-Faire Constitnionalism. 3 LAW & HtsT REv 293.
318-21 (1985).
102. As Jackson himself said in his famous veto message on the Second Bank of the United States.
the law should not add "artificial distinctions" or seek to "grant titles, gratuities, and exclusive privileges.
to make the rich richer and the potent more powerful." Andrew Jackson. Veto Message. July 10. 1832. 2
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 576-89 (Richardson ed.. 1897). quoted in PAUL BR--'T &
SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTrUTIONAL DECISiONMAKING 52 (3d ed 1992). see alto J R
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resentment of class legislation was tied to their suspicion of status distinctions
among free white men; it went hand in hand with the crusade for universal
manhood suffrage.'03 This egalitarian urge of Jacksonian democrats was
connected to their resentment of Eastern financiers and monopolists, whom
they saw as the great barriers to equality of opportunity for all free white male
citizens.
In the terms of this Essay, the Jacksonian era was the time of another
cultural struggle, in which white working men attacked the superior status of
Eastern elites, accusing the latter of creating a new class of nobility based on
corporate power and financial privilege." n The Jacksonian concept of "class
legislation" was originally designed to oppose corporate charters and business
monopolies, because of the fear that these would create a new class of
economic "nobility" elevated above the ordinary white working man. By the
end of the Civil War, however, the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
understood the concept as encompassing the converse phenomenon: legislation
that denigrated or demeaned a group of persons and held them as less equal
than others.0 5 In his proposed joint resolution for drafting the Fourteenth
Amendment, for example, Charles Sumner invoked the Jacksonian heritage
when he claimed that the proposed Fourteenth Amendment should abolish
"oligarchy, aristocracy, caste, or monopoly with particular privileges and
powers.' 1E6 He spoke of monopoly and caste in the same breath, equating
legislation that singles out groups for special treatment with legislation that
demeans and stigmatizes groups as social inferiors. Likewise Senator Howard,
the floor manager of the Fourteenth Amendment, offered an expanded
interpretation of the Jacksonian principle. He argued that the amendment's goal
was to "abolis[h] all class legislation .... and [do] away with the injustice of
subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to another."'0 7
Howard also seemed to equate the dangers of creating a new nobility with the
dangers of maintaining a class of social inferiors.
The problem of unjust status hierarchy is implicated in several other
clauses of the Constitution. For example, the Establishment Clause (especially
POLE, THE PURSUIT OF EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 145 (1978).
103. See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA
POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 35-38 (1993); RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL
TRADITION 70-78 (1948).
104. See HOFSTADTER, supra note 103, at 70-79; ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF
JACKSON 132-33, 306-07 (1950).
105. On the transformation of the Jacksonian idea of class legislation, see ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL,
FREE LABOR, FREE MEN 90-91 (1970); Yudof, supra note 99, at 1379; cf. NELSON, supra note 99, at 18
(noting use of class legislation idea in antislavery rhetoric). Needless to say, Andrew Jackson himself would
have been taken aback by this reinterpretation. See POLE, supra note 102, at 146.
106. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. (1st Sess.) 674 (1866). The joint resolution failed, but the debate
affected the final language of the amendment. See ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION
74-75 (1992); see also Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 51 n.8 (1947) (quoting Sumner's resolution
as evidence of meaning of Fourteenth Amendment).
107. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. (1st Sess.) 2766 (1866).
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after its application to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment) denies
the state the right to establish a single church and thus label one particular
status group as preferred over all others. As Michael McConnell has astutely
pointed out, resolving the potential conflicts between different religious sects
was the new nation's first experiment with multiculturalism." ° The First
Amendment guaranteed that religious groups would and could compete with
each other for converts, but the federal government (and later the states) would
not be permitted to show favoritism toward any of them. Thus the Religion
Clauses are both a means of status disestablishment and a means for providing
rules of political fairness for the ensuing status competition.1°9
Two of the most important status-disestablishing provisions appear in the
original 1787 Constitution. They are the Bill of Attainder and Titles of
Nobility Clauses. t1 ° As Akhil Amar has recently argued, the Bill of Attainder
Clauses are designed to prevent governments from singling out and punishing
108. See Michael W. McConnell, Multiculguraham. Majoritrtaom. and Educational Choice What
Does Our Constitutional Tradition Have to Say?, 1991 U CHI LI-GAL F 123. 131-34
109. Justice O'Connor's "endorsement" test makes considerable sense in terms of status categones
O'Connor argues that the government violates the Establishment Clause when its actions have the purpose
or effect of endorsing religion or non-religion to a reasonable observer Endorsement violates the
Establishment Clause because the government may not make people's religious beliefs or their membership
in a particular religious group determinative of their political standing in the communit) See Wallace v
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69-70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concumng) In other words. goermment may not
proclaim that people have higher or lower status based on their religious affiliation When govemment
action has the purpose or effect of endorsing religion, it sends a message to some members of the
community that they are favored insiders; and it sends a message to others who adhere to different beliefs
that they are disfavored outsiders, "not full members of the political community" Lynch v Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice O'Connor's endorsement test has much in common with Charles Lawrence's "cultural
meaning" theory of equal protection. See Lawrence. supra note 2. Indeed. both tests have much in common
with Karst's original "equal citizenship" principle. See Karst, %upra note 2 Lawrence argues that the
government violates the Equal Protection Clause when it sends a message of cultural infenority to racial
minorities. See Lawrence, supra note 2, at 350-51, 355-56, 363-64 Like Lawrence. O'Connor focuses on
the cultural meaning of contested governmental action. Like Lawrence. she does not require any deliberate
government intent to degrade or harm; the mere effect of endorsement as judged by a reasonable observer
is sufficient.
Justice O'Connor's and Lawrence's tests are similar because both are concerned % ith managing status
competition: Both tests prohibit certain government actions that attempt to raise the status of some social
groups at the expense of others. This project has two consequences First, both tests require judges to
investigate the cultural meaning of government action to determine if an injury to status has occurred
Second, both tests require a criterion of reasonableness to adjudicate inevitable disagreements about the
meaning of what the government has done.
110. Because the two principles apply to both the states and the federal government, there are actually
four clauses in all. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. cl. 3 (prohibiting federal bills of attainder); id § 10. cl I
(prohibiting state bills of attainder); id. § 9. cl. 8 (prohibiting federal grant of titles of nobility), id § 10.
cl. I (prohibiting state grant of titles of nobility). The Republican Government Clause. id an IV, § 4.
might also be read as status disestablishing to the extent that one believes that equal citizenship is a
requirement of republican government. Cf Akhil Reed Amar. The Central Meaunig of Republican
Govertunent: Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem. 65 CoLt L REV 749.
750, 773, 782-86 (1994) (arguing that central guarantee of republican government is popular sovereignty.
which implies constitutional guarantees of equal citizenship). Akhil Reed Amar, Forn Acres and a Mule
A Republican Theory of Minimal Entitlements, 13 HARV J L & PUB POL'Y 37 (19901 (arguing that
republican political theory creates obligation to redisibute property to create independent citizenry and
give each citizen stake in society).
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identifiable groups because of who they are."' In recent years Bill of
Attainder cases have often concerned the government's attempts to brand and
punish specific individuals." 2 Yet Amar reminds us that the Clauses were
also originally designed to protect social groups, including groups bound
together through ties of descent and kinship.'"
3
The Titles of Nobility Clauses are perhaps even more important examples.
These Clauses have little meaning for us today precisely because of the success
of the American Revolution in dismantling a profound and pervasive form of
status hierarchy. Although the Constitution speaks of "titles" of nobility, the
concern was with much more than mere bestowal of titles. Nobility was far
more than the right to use a particular name. It was an entire social system of
superiority and inferiority, of habits of deference and condescension, of social
rank and political, cultural and economic privilege." 4 Gordon Wood points
out that the hierarchy of aristocracy was defended on grounds of seemingly
natural differences between the nobility and common folk: "So distinctive and
so separated was the aristocracy from ordinary folk that many still thought the
two groups represented two orders of being .... People often assumed that
a handsome child, though apparently a commoner, had to be some gentleman's
bastard offspring."'" 5 Conversely, "[i]n our egalitarian-minded age it is
difficult for us to appreciate the degree of contempt with which the aristocracy
and the gentry of the traditional monarchical society had regarded the lower
orders.""' 6 The latter, "when they were noticed at all, were often regarded
as little better than animals.""' 7
When the Framers and Ratifiers of the Constitution denied both the states
and the federal government the right to grant titles of nobility, they tried to
stamp out this pernicious system of social hierarchy. They feared monarchy not
only because of the tyranny of kings but because the monarch was the social
and symbolic head of an entire system of social prestige based on nobility.
111. See Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer ' Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REV. 203,
218 (1996).
112. See, e.g., Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 847
(1984) (noting requirement of legislatively specified persons); Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433
U.S. 425, 468-69 (1977) (same); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315-16 (1946) (same); see also
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 643 (2d ed. 1988) ("The essence of the bill of
attainder ban is that it proscribes legislative punishment of specified persons .... ).
113. See Amar, supra note Ill, at 214-18. Similarly, Frederick Douglass argued that slavery violated
the Bill of Attainder Clauses because they prohibit hereditary status disabilities:
The Constitution forbids the passing of a bill of attainder. that is, a law entailing upon the child
the disabilities and hardships imposed upon the parent. Every slave law in America might be
repealed on this very ground. The slave is made a slave because his mother is a slave.
Frederick Douglass, The Constitution of the United States: Is It Pro or Anti-Slavery?, in 2 THE LIFE AND
WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS: PRE-CIVIL WAR DECADE 1850-1860, at 478 (Philip S. Foner ed.,
1950).
114. See WOOD, supra note 68, at 11-24.
115. Id. at 27.
116. Id. at 235.
117. Id.
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Thus, in many different ways the Framers and Ratifiers tried to ensure that
nothing like a hereditary monarchy or a hereditary nobility would ever rise up
in the United States."18
The Framers' and Ratifiers' opposition to monarchy was part of a larger
social revolution against the social hierarchy that monarchy symbolized. Their
crusade against nobility was the true radicalism of the American Revolution:
the dismantling of monarchical order and aristocratic privilege in the name of
liberty and equality."9 From this perspective we can see how the Titles of
Nobility and Bill of Attainder Clauses serve complementary functions. The
first prevents state maintenance of a status hierarchy by prohibiting the creation
of a group of social superiors; the second prevents the state from singling out
particular individuals, or more importantly, particular groups, as social
pariahs. 20
Moreover, each of these status-dismantling clauses implicitly relies on the
asymmetry of status hierarchies. Status hierarchies are asymmetrical because
higher and lower status individuals are not social equals. Hence the cultural
meanings of their actions as well as actions directed against them may differ
significantly. For example, when a higher status person teases a lower status
one, the act may be interpreted as bullying or lording over a social inferior; but
a lower status person's teasing a higher status person may be understood as a
permissible tweaking of the sensibilities of those higher up in the status
hierarchy. 12' The cultural meaning of government benefits also differs for
high and low status groups. If the government directly benefited high status
118. The Federalist Papers took great care to distinguish the President from "a king of Great Britain.
who is an hereditary monarch, possessing the crown as a patnmony descendible to his heirs forever," and
to emphasize the President's limited powers and subjection to ordinary law THE Ft.IhRAusT No 69. at
416 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). While a President "can confer no pnvdcgcs
whatever," Hamilton argued, a monarch "can make denizens of aliens" and "noblemen of commoners " Id
at 422. As Jack Rakove notes, supporters of the Constitution argued that the President would have no
private fortune large enough to purchase a court of adherents or rause a private army on his own. and that
the 35-year-old requirement (fairly old in eighteenth-century terms) would prevent most sons from
immediately succeeding their fathers, because "'in the course of nature very few fathers leave a son who
has arrived at that age."' JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS ANt) IDEAS IN THE MAKIG
OF THE CONSTITUTION 276 & 408 n.98 (1996) (quoting A Native of Virginia. Observations upon the
Proposed Plan of Federal Government (Petersburg, Va., 1788). it 9 THE DOCUAENTrARY HItSTORY OF THrE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTrrTUON 679 (Merrill Jensen ct al eds.. 1976)) Ironically. the nation's second
President, John Adams, did have a son who later became President, but almost a quarter of a century after
he left office.
119. Both concerns are equally important to this revolution. The Titles of Nobility Clauses. like other
status-dismantling clauses of the Constitution, are not simply demands for equality They are also demands
for liberty. The Framers and Ratifiers well understood that inequality of social circumstances limits the
liberty of those less well off by denying them equal opportunity Even today social hierarchies inhibit
opportunity and prevent individuals from self-realization and the ability to control their own lives In
dismantling unjust systems of status hierarchy, we must keep the connections between equality and equal
liberty always in mind.
120. See Amar, supra note I11: Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry. The Pariah Priciple. 13 CONST
COMMENTARY 257 (1996).
121. Conversely, demands for deference and recognition shown by high status individuals may be
understood as appropriate when similar demands by low status persons might be interpreted as "uppity."
"bitchy," or "making a federal case."
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groups-for example, if it created an affirmative action program for whites-it
would appear to be reinforcing or approving of existing status hierarchies; but
when it benefits lower status groups, it is more likely to be seen as dismantling
or at least counteracting them.
122
The prohibitions of the Bill of Attainder and Titles of Nobility Clauses
depend on this asymmetry of status relations. As a result, both are asymmetric
in their concerns. As Amar notes, Bills of Attainder are concerned with social
exclusion rather than social inclusion. Laws that single some persons out for
disfavored treatment because of their identity "are in tension with our
constitutional tradition, and should be strongly disfavored."'23 Yet, Amar
explains, laws that single out individuals or groups for inclusion rather than
exclusion do not violate this principle. 24 For example, a bill that singles out
a particular individual for deportation is constitutionally different from a
private immigration bill that allows a single person to remain in the United
States. I 5
Favored treatment of individuals or groups on the basis of their social
identity can violate the 1787 Constitution, but only if this treatment rises to the
level of creating or perpetuating a title of nobility. However, the Titles of
Nobility Clauses are also asymmetric: They concern only the maintenance or
creation of social hierarchy through law, not the destruction of such a
hierarchy. Moreover, not all government benefits violate the Clauses; to do so
they must help create a set of meanings of social superiority. Merely singling
out an individual for a special benefit is a far cry from creating or attempting
to create a new Brahmin-style caste or a new social elite. Just as the Bill of
Attainder Clauses are not violated by the attempt to raise the status of lower
level groups, neither are the Titles of Nobility Clauses violated by attempts to
dismantle status inequalities.
The debate over affirmative action looks quite different from the
standpoint of these "sociologically informed" clauses of the Constitution.
Consider education as an example. Admission preferences that attempt to
122. Precisely because direct government favoritism toward high status groups is increasingly viewed
with suspicion, contemporary status hierarchies are usually supported by legal doctrines that make no direct
reference to status categories like race or gender; nevertheless these doctrines may have highly
disproportionate and predictable effects on different status groups. At the same time, status hierarchies adapt
themselves so that they can be preserved and reproduced without overt legal support. Reva Siegel calls this
adaptive transformation of status hierarchies the "modernization" of status regimes. See Siegel, supra note
36, at 2174-78. After modernization, preservation of the social status quo looks like a matter of formal
neutrality or formal equality before the law, while status legislation that directly attempts to improve the
lot of low status groups looks like "special treatment," and indeed may be attacked precisely because it
makes explicit reference to status categories. See Siegel, supra note 37, manuscript at 23, 29-33, 35-37;
cf MAcKINNON, supra note 2, at 32-40 (critiquing equal treatment and difference approaches to gender
equality).
123. Akbil Reed Amar, Justice Kennedy awnd the Ideal of Equality, 28 PAC. L.J. 517 (forthcoming Apr.
1997) (manuscript at 23, on file with author).
124. See id.
125. See id.; see also Amar, supra note Il1, at 212-14.
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increase the number of historically disadvantaged minorities are not a bill of
attainder against white applicants, for they do not single whites out as social
inferiors. They do not turn blacks and Hispanics into a new class of
aristocrats.' 26
Admission preferences clearly do not send the message that racial
minorities are superior human beings by virtue of their identity. Whites may
grumble that blacks and other minorities are getting "special treatment," but
they would hardly view these preferences as a governmental assertion that
blacks have higher social status or have a greater share of positive qualities
and social esteem. To the contrary, so powerful are the social meanings of race
and ethnicity in this country that affirmative action preferences often create the
opposite social meaning among whites. They see these preferences as further
evidence of the inferiority and unworthiness of racial and ethnic
minorities. 127 Even if they do not believe themselves prejudiced, many whites
still regard themselves as social superiors to blacks, and blacks still retain
many cultural associations of inferiority. As long as "[t]he white race deems
itself to be the dominant race in this country,"' 2 as Justice Harlan put it,
racial preferences cannot be construed as Titles of Nobility.
In fact, admissions preferences have a very different symbolic effect: They
are a sign of increased political clout. The ability of racial minorities to
demand and receive affirmative action shows that they have gained increasing
status in American society. This combination of symbolic and material benefit
creates real status anxiety among white Americans, and has led to predictable
forms of backlash.
C. Status Hierarchy and Caste
Following Kenneth Karst's seminal work, many scholars have used caste
as a central organizing concept in antidiscrimination law. They have pointed
to stigma and the perpetuation of caste-like relationships as the touchstone of
constitutional concern.'29 There is ample historical precedent for this. As we
126. See Amar, supra note 123, at 24. In Fullilove v. Klurmck. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). Justice Stewart
tried to compare affirmative action policies to titles of nobility, arguing that they were -prcferencc~sI based
on lineage." Id. at 531 (Stewart, J., dissenting). But Justice Stewart did not claim (nor could he) that, ike
titles of nobility, such preferences were a sign of the social superiority of racial and ethnic minonties His
comparison failed to acknowledge the most crucial aspect of a title of nobility: that it proclaims supenor
social as well as legal status.
127. Indeed, even though they facially benefit from racial preferences. miontites are hardly
unconcerned that preferences might confirm or enhance rather than remedy social stigma- See. e g.
STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 11-17. 47-69 (1991)
128. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan. J . dissenting)
129. Karst's theory of equality, for example, "centers on those aspects of equality that are most closely
bound to the sense of self and the sense of inclusion in a community." KENNETH L. KARST, BELoNGDG
TO AMERICA: EQUAL CrnIzENSHIP AND THE CONsTrruTirlON 3 (1989). Hence his -equal citizenship'
principle holds that "[elach individual is presumptively entitled to be treated by the organizcd society as
a respected, responsible, and participating member. Stated negatively, the pnnciple forbids the organized
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have seen, several framers of the Fourteenth Amendment specifically made
analogies to caste. Justice Harlan's famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson
insisted that "[t]here is no caste here" in the United States.'30 As Dan Farber
and Suzanna Sherry have noted, many Supreme Court opinions have stated that
various provisions of the Constitution forbid legislation that creates or
maintains social caste.' 3'
Generally speaking, American constitutional lawyers have tended to use
the word "caste" as a general term of disapproval, but with virtually no
attention to whether their usage matches the nature of existing caste
systems.132 Rather, what they have meant by "caste" has usually been some
form of status hierarchy.
In the early 1980s Paul Dimond articulated what he called the anti-caste
principle: "[E]ach person has the right to be free from the continuing effects
of caste discrimination in the laws, programs, official decisions, government,
and community affairs of these United States.' 33 Dimond's version of the
anti-caste principle requires government to take affirmative steps to eliminate
the past effects of caste discrimination. 34 Like Karst's equal citizenship
principle, it also prohibits government action that "perpetuate[s] longstanding
stereotypes that stigmatize a racial minority as inherently inferior or
undeserving compared to the white majority."135
Just as Dimond's original anti-caste principle was specifically concerned
with race discrimination, Cass Sunstein's later version also focuses on the
society to treat an individual as a member of an inferior or dependent caste or as a nonparticipant." Id.
130. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
131. See Farber & Sherry, supra note 120, at 266-70.
132. Generally speaking, in a caste system "society is divided up into a large number of permanent
groups which are at once specialized, hierachized, and separated (in matter of marriage, food, physical
contact) in relation to each other." Louis DUMONT, HOMO HIERARCHICUs: THE CASTE SYSTEM AND ITS
IMPLICATIoNS 259 (Mark Sainsbury et al. trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1980) (1970). These
differentiations have in common the opposition of purity and impurity. "[T]his basic opposition can segment
itself without limit," creating multiple orders of caste. Id. The idea of mutual opposition is central to the
idea of caste, so that society as a whole is the unity of the castes in their mutual relations to each other.
See id. Although a hierarchy of castes seems to divide society, it actually unifies it by "connecting it to
what appears to it to be universal, namely a conception of the cosmic order." Id. at 260. Note that within
this definition, women do not form a separate caste. Rather, the exchange of women through marriage is
a means through which caste is reproduced over generations. Society is organized and reproduced through
rules of marriage and descent. See id. at 123-24. Nor does this definition reflect religious discrimination,
because members of different castes often share common religious beliefs. Indeed, the hierarchy is often
based on religious cosmology and justified by reference to shared religious belief. See id. at 260.
Modernized Western societies lack "caste" in this strict sense, because they no longer conceive group
distinctions-between the races, for example--to be based on a natural order that unifies and gives meaning
to society as a whole. Western thought has abandoned ideas of a natural social order in order to pursue a
"rational" social order. Western societies still feature social stratification, to be sure, but this stratification
is based on status and class distinctions, which bear important resemblances to traditional caste structures
but are also importantly different.
133. Paul R. Dimond, The Anti-Caste Principle-Toward a Constitutional Standard for Review of Race
Cases, 30 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 3 (1983).
134. See id. at 5-7.
135. Id. at 6-7.
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social subordination of a limited set of groups.' 36 It "forbids social and legal
practices from translating highly visible and morally irrelevant differences into
systemic social disadvantage, unless there is a very good reason for society to
do so.' t37 This anti-caste principle deals with "a special problem of
inequality" 38 that "arises when members of a group suffer from a range of
disadvantages because of a group-based characteristic that is both visible for
all to see and irrelevant from a moral point of view."' 39 Sunstein emphasizes
that the group affected has to be systematically disadvantaged "in multiple and
important spheres of life"'' in ways that affect "basic participation as a
citizen in a democracy."'' These realms of life may include, among others,
"education, freedom from private and public violence, income and wealth,
political representation, longevity, health, and political influence."'4 2
Sunstein's principle is designed to focus only on limited forms of status
hierarchy: in particular, those based on race, sex, and disability.'43 The poor
are not protected: first, because they "represent a broad, amorphous, not easily
identified, and to some degree shifting group";' and second, because
Sunstein's principle is specifically designed not to upset existing market forces
significantly.'45 Jews, homosexuals, and Asian Americans are not protected
because although they suffer discrimination, they do not suffer systematic
disadvantage in many spheres of life." Moreover, in the case of
homosexuals (and in the case of some Jews, though not male Orthodox Jews
and haredim), group membership is not necessarily visible. 7
136. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MIcH. L REV. 2410, 2430 (1994)
137. Id. at 2411.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 2411-12.
140. Id. at 2429.
141. Id.
142. Id. In this sense, Sunstein's version of the anti-caste pnnciple strongly resembles Owen Fiss's
group disadvantage principle. See Fiss, supra note 2, at 147-56.
143. See Sunstein, supra note 136, at 2438.
144. Id.
145. As Sunstein points out, he is most interested in "discrete contexts" in which it is hard to argue
that current practices benefit the least well off, and
in which second-class citizenship is systemic and occurs in multiple spheres and along casily
identifiable and sharply defined lines; in which the morally irelevant characterstic is highly
visible; in which there will be no major threat to a market economy; and in which the costs of
implementation are most unlikely to be terribly high.
Id.
These concessions tend to beg the question whether the market might have any significant role to play
in the perpetuation of "caste-like" relationships. Conversely, Sunstein's hedging seems to suggest that if
a system of social subordination would require disruptions in the economy to be corrected-for example.
a massive redistribution from whites to blacks-the system of subordination is not casi-based- It is a sort
of cost-benefit approach to defining caste rather than a sociological one.
146. See id. at 2443. Thus not all racial discrimination falls under Sunsten's anti-caste pnnciple
Sunstein does not address whether the principle would have applied to the treatment of Chinese immigrants
in the nineteenth century or Japanese Americans during World War 11.
147. See id. at 2433 n.74.
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Sunstein's anti-caste principle does not insist on any single criterion of
social stratification. As he himself emphasizes, his criteria for inclusion are
pragmatic rather than sociological. 148 As a result, his restriction of the anti-
caste principle to race, sex, and disability is somewhat arbitrary. First, the
patterns of reproduction of status hierarchy are different in each of the cases
he is concerned with.'49 Second, the social stereotypes and cultural meanings
employed to maintain the hierarchy also differ for each group. Third, as Farber
and Sherry have noted, restricting the "definition of caste to visible
characteristics"'151 is false to actual caste systems; for example, it "might
paradoxically exclude the Indian untouchable caste."'' Fourth, exclusion of
the poor from the anti-caste principle seems particularly odd given that
Sunstein's originalist justification for the anti-caste principle is the founding
generation's social revolution against the monarchy and the prerogatives of
nobility, reflected in the Titles of Nobility Clauses. 52 But this revolution was
148. See id. at 2429, 2432 (noting pragmatic considerations behind his definition).
149. To give only one example, traditional caste systems like those in the Indian subcontinent are
perpetuated through lines of descent enforced by marriage rules and taboos. Generally speaking,
untouchables are expected to marry untouchables, and their children inherit their caste ranking. See
DUMONT, supra note 132, at 109 (describing general rule of endogamy). Generally speaking, illegitimate
sexual unions result in loss of status to the child. Illegitimate children are usually identified with the
mother's social group if she is of inferior caste. See id. at 115. Discrimination against African Americans
is closest to this system, especially given its long connections to the system of slavery. Generally speaking,
the children of slaves were born into slavery, even if their real fathers were their white masters. See DAVIS,
supra note 30, at 48-49; Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic lie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 225-27 (1995);
Dorothy E. Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 935, 943 (1996). Enormous legal
and cultural efforts went into preserving the social identity of race both during the period of slavery and
the later Jim Crow era. Examples are rules against miscegenation (often opportunistically and hypocritically
enforced), rules against racial intermarriage (often rigorously enforced), and the legal rule of hypodescent,
in which "one drop of black blood" made a person black. See DAVIS, supra note 30, at 47-58. Denial of
familial relations between whites and blacks, even when they clearly existed, coupled with social
segregation, tended to reproduce a system much closer to Indian-style caste.
By contrast, disabled individuals do not always pass on their disabilities to their children, and
approximately half of the children born to women are not themselves women. Nor, as far as I am aware,
has any legal rule of hypodescent been applied in the United States to children of women or the disabled.
Women are the wives, daughters, and mothers of the men who are elevated above them, and disabled
persons are usually family members of the nondisabled.
150. Farber & Sherry, supra note 120, at 273.
151. Id. The restriction lacks historical sense as well. The terms and devices of social stratification
change over time. Religious affiliation is not always visible, but it has often served as a marker of social
status. Jews are comparatively well off in the United States today, but even as late as the early 1950s they
were subject to rampant discrimination in education and employment. See, e.g., Harold Braverman, Medical
School Quotas, in BARRIERS: PATTERNS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST JEWS 74, 74-77 (N.C. Belth ed.,
1958); Albert Weiss, "Jews Need Not Apply", in id. at 43, 43-47. According to Sunstein's criteria, Jews
would never have been the beneficiaries of the anti-caste principle if being Jewish is not a visible trait.
In any case, the "visibility" of "Jewish traits" is itself a historical construction. It depends on many
factors, including the cultural practices of Jews themselves-for example, whether they are largely secular
or largely orthodox. As society changes, the saliency of cultural markers varies over time. When anti-
Semitism was more socially acceptable, Jewish identity may have been more visible to some people,
precisely because more people looked to it as a means of discrimination. See Sunstein, supra note 136, at
2432. Conversely, because Jews are largely integrated into American society (and because the intermarriage
rate is astronomical), Jewish identity may seem less salient.
152. See Sunstein, supra note 136, at 2428-29.
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itself about social class (an amorphous category even then) and decidedly not
about race, gender, or disability.
The more basic problem with Sunstein's version of the anti-caste principle,
however, is that it makes no attempt to connect its criteria to any sociological
account of how stratification occurs in actual caste systems. In this sense, it is
truly an "anti"-caste principle, for it has little to do with the actual sociological
phenomenon of caste.
Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry have suggested that the Fourteenth
Amendment includes a much narrower "pariah principle": The government
cannot create or sanction pariah or outcast groups.'53 Treating "a group of
citizens as pariahs ... imposes two unacceptable harms. It simultaneously
brands them as inferior and encourages others to ostracize them.""' Farber
and Sherry argue that this principle operates not only in equal protection cases,
but in Bill of Attainder and Eighth Amendment cases.' 55 However, their
principle is a very limited claim about equality. It is not really an attempt to
map features of social practice onto legal doctrine. It is not a general demand
for equality in the face of unjust social stratification, nor is it concerned with
systematic disadvantage. The "pariah principle" is limited only to the most
extreme forms of exclusion like that faced by untouchables in a caste system,
rather than an attack on general systems of social stratification.'" The
principle outlaws the tip of a much larger iceberg without asking how the tip
arose or what supports it.
First, the principle focuses not on the general status of social groups or
existing social hierarchies, but on whether the government has in any particular
case treated a group like pariahs. 157 According to Farber and Sherry's theory,
a group like left-handed persons could be made pariahs by a single piece of
legislation even if there were no previous history of discrimination against
them and they were not a discrete and insular minority invoking heightened
scrutiny.158
Second, mere creation of a stigma or a message of inferiority is apparently
insufficient to invoke the principle. The message sent by caste legislation must
be "even stronger: all right-thinking people should avoid any contact with
those the legislation makes pariahs.""'59 [Pjariahs," Farber and Sherry
explain, "are not simply the group at the bottom of the social or economic
153. See Farber & Sherry, supra note 120. at 265-67
154. Id. at 267.
155. See id. at 268-69.
156. See id. at 272.
157. See id. at 274.
158. See id.
159. Id. at 271. Despite this requirement, the psychological consequences of the message of incrionty
are apparently irrelevant to Farber and Sherry. The panah principle is not concmrned with the self-esteem
of the outcast group, but "is primarily focused on the victims" nght to participate in civil society" Id at
272.
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ladder." 6' They are "shunned and isolated .... treated as if [they] had a
loathsome and contagious disease."'' To violate the pariah principle, the
government must send "[t]he message... that outcasts are not merely inferior
[but that] they are not fully human, and contact with them is dangerous and
degrading."'6 2 The demand of such extreme isolation tends to mesh poorly
with Farber and Sherry's first claim that a group's general social status is
irrelevant. It is difficult to imagine a society that would want to send so
extreme a message about a group that had not already suffered a history of
discrimination. Generally speaking, pariah status does not usually come from
nowhere; it is usually the result of a gradual accumulation of negative
associations and social meanings of inferiority.'63 Thus, Farber and Sherry
offer an extremely limited equality principle isolated from other forms of
unjust discrimination. As a result, their "pariah principle" is abstracted from
the actual social processes that produce the kinds of extreme legislation to
which their principle would apply.
American constitutional theorists' romance with "caste" as an explanatory
category needs serious reappraisal. Although Justice Harlan's famous words
have probably made it too late to jettison the expression "caste," social
stratification in the United States does not really match the technical definition
of caste. "Caste" is really a metonym used by constitutional scholars to
describe a set of different forms of unjust social hierarchy, of which true caste
relations would be only a very extreme example not currently found in this
country. Hence "caste" is at best an effective hyperbole; it is used to describe
a number of different methods of unjust social stratification and a number of
different forms of unfair status competition. But these forms of hierarchy are
no less unjust simply because they do not conform to a rigorous definition of
caste.
D. Which Groups? Which Hierarchies?
I have been urging a shift from a model that focuses on discrimination and
equal treatment to a model that focuses on the existence and dismantling of
unjust status hierarchy. This inquiry does not remove normative questions. It
simply asks them in different ways. Instead of asking whether certain
classifications should be regarded as suspect, I am asking whether certain
status hierarchies exist that are so unjust that the Constitution demands their
disestablishment.
160. Id. at 266.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. An example of a pariah status that could develop in a very short time would be a group that had
contracted a previously unknown disease like AIDS. Even in that case, pariah status would rest in part on
a long history of social dread and irrational behavior toward people with disease.
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Nevertheless, this inquiry into status hierarchy should not be confused with
a general constitutional principle of equal protection. The Equal Protection
Clause is concerned with many other things besides unjust status hierarchy. It
serves many different functions-including assessing the rationality of tax
legislation" or interferences with the right to travel. "i Because all of
these different functions are in some sense about equality, they tend to be
confused with each other. We would be better served if we understood the
problem of unjust status hierarchy as a distinct problem, to which other
questions of constitutional equality may bear only a family resemblance.
Conversely, the constitutional principle of opposition to unjust status
hierarchies is partially vindicated by the Equal Protection Clause, but it is also
the concern of many other clauses as well. As I have argued above, the
Constitution's hostility to status hierarchy is not located in a single
clause-one can find it in the Reconstruction Amendments, the Titles of
Nobility Clauses, the Bill of Attainder Clauses, the Establishment Clause, and
the Republican Government Clause. Thus, the principle I am elaborating
overlaps with several clauses and is not the exclusive concern of any one of
them."6
The problem of status hierarchy is not a purely descriptive problem. It is
a question of unjust subordination. Yet if the Constitution does not oppose all
status hierarchies, which ones does it oppose? What distinguishes the low
status of homosexuals, for example, from social disapproval of gamblers,
sluggards, gossips, opticians, and MTV watchers? Why is one an unjust status
hierarchy while the others are not, or at least not so unjust that the Constitution
should be concerned with them?
Gamblers, sluggards, gossips, opticians, and MTV watchers may be groups
in the ordinary sense of that word, and some of them may even be interest
groups in the political scientist's sense. However, they are not currently status
groups in an ongoing status hierarchy; and they are not groups who suffer
overlapping and reinforcing forms of subordination and social disadvantage due
to their place in that social hierarchy. This is not due to any physical property
of these groups but a contingent fact of social history. There is no reason why
a social hierarchy could not have been organized on any number of different
164. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992)
165. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S, 618 (1969).
166. Constitutional clauses often exist for a number of different reasons and cmbody a number of
different principles. The Equal Protection Clause, for example, is concerned with many forms of incquality
other than unjust hierarchies of status. It is concerned with unfair political procedures and unfair allocations
of material advantage regardless of whether these are part of status hierarchies. Moreover. courts use the
Equal Protection Clause to address the constitutionality of many forms of economic and social legtslation.
ranging from tax abatements to restrictions on ice-skating nnks Indeed. part of the difficulty in
constitutional law's recognition of the problem of status hierarchy is that the tools it offers to analyze the
problem serve many different functions. The fact that the status disestablishment pnnciple can be found
in the Equal Protection Clause, for example, can lead us to imagine (incorrectly) that the problems of
equality are the same across different areas of social life.
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lines, using any number of different traits. It happens to be the case, however,
that mankind has tended to use skin color, gender, and religious belief as its
most familiar technologies of social stratification and oppression. The Equal
Protection Clause-and other clauses of the Constitution-may protect
sluggards, opticians, and MTV watchers against various forms of government
overreaching. Even so, this is not the sort of evil I am concerned with here.
My central concern is with those status hierarchies where status identity
is a central feature of one's social existence, and affects many different spheres
of one's life. There may be a status hierarchy between skiers and
snowboarders. Being a skier rather than a snowboarder, however, is not a
central feature of one's social identity. It is not something that affects many
overlapping aspects of one's everyday interactions with others, or that has
ripple effects in various parts of one's life, including wealth, social
connections, political power, employment prospects, the ability to have
intimate relationships and form families, and so on. By contrast, being a black
person as opposed to a white person, or being female as opposed to being
male, is a central feature of one's identity, at least in contemporary America.
It does affect a large percentage of one's personal interactions with others, and
it has many mutually supporting and overlapping effects.
Homosexuals are in a somewhat different situation because their social
identity depends on how far out of the closet they are and to whom. For fully
out homosexuals, their identity does have significant overlapping effects, for
they cannot have homosexual marriages, their relationships are not sanctioned
by law, and they are subject to discrimination, harassment, and moral
denunciation. Homosexuals can hide their identity by staying in the closet, but
this merely means that they purchase some degree of higher status by their
inability to announce what they are to the world. Thus their homosexuality
affects their interactions with others by virtue of its absence, somewhat like
interactions between whites and those blacks who are sufficiently light-skinned
to "pass" as white while retaining an internal sense of being black.
In short, unlike snowboarders or skiers, homosexuals are a social group
whose status is central to their general social identity. Moreover, unlike these
other groups, homosexuals exist in a fairly overt hierarchy of status, in which
they and their lifestyle are routinely condemned as immoral, abnormal, deviant,
and against the laws of God and Nature. The status hierarchy that places
homosexuals beneath heterosexuals is different in many important respects
from the system of social meanings used to keep blacks in an inferior position,
but it is no less real. Not only is homosexuality subjected to intense social
disapproval, but homosexuals are still subject to de jure discrimination in many
areas, including marriage and sexual relationships. Homosexuals can avoid
legal and social disabilities only by remaining in the closet; the stresses and
strains in their lives resulting from this masquerade are simply the flip side of
the disabilities they suffer from making their sexual orientation public.
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But that is hardly the end of the matter. It is not enough that homosexuals
exist in a status hierarchy sustained both by law and by social custom. They
must also exist in an unjust status hierarchy. Why is the hierarchy of
heterosexuality over homosexuality unjust? Even if this hierarchy is gradually
breaking down in social custom and convention, why should the Constitution
use its authority to accelerate the trend?
The answer to this question does not depend on the existence or absence
of so-called immutable characteristics. It depends rather on the nature of the
status hierarchy; it depends on the social meaning of being homosexual. To
decide whether a status hierarchy is just or unjust, we have to examine the
justice of the system of social meanings that create and perpetuate that status
hierarchy.
The comparatively low status of homosexuals in a society dominated by
heterosexuals derives from a more general status hierarchy organized around
gender. This hierarchy defines masculinity and femininity in heterosexual terms
and bestows higher status on the former.'67 This status hierarchy is unjust
because it organizes social structure, distributes dignitary and material benefits,
and shapes and justifies people's life chances through systematic privileging
of things associated with being male over those associated with being female.
Due in part to the success of previous social movements, our society has
formally repudiated gender discrimination as unjust; nevertheless, the set of
social meanings that privilege masculinity over femininity continue to permeate
our social existence in multiple and overlapping areas of life. Homosexuals
occupy low status because they transgress this set of meanings. If this status
hierarchy is unjust, then discrimination against homosexuals, which forms an
important part of this system, is also unjust, and the Constitution should assist
in dismantling it.
The social bias against homosexuality is part of the preservation of
traditional gender roles and stereotypes, which are both heterosexual and
patriarchal. Society discriminates against homosexuals because homosexuals
violate heterosexual understandings about what it means to be male and
female. Homosexuals transgress social meanings about gender that help
constitute gender identity. This system of meanings defines masculinity and
femininity in terms of complementary traits and attraction to the opposite sex.
Men are defined as people who are attracted to women; women are defined as
people who are the object of sexual attraction by men. More importantly, this
system of social meanings about gender is itself part of an unjust status
hierarchy that privileges males and things associated with maleness over
females and things associated with femaleness. Males and masculinity are
167. See ANDREW KOPPE-MAN. ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAN AND SOCIAL EQUALrTY 146-76 (1996).
Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Sionr'telling. Gender.Role Stereotypes. and Legal
Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 511 (1992); Sylvia A Law. Homosexuahty
and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REv 187
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defined not only in terms of their opposition to females and femininity, but in
terms of their superiority.
Homosexuality, and especially male homosexuality, threatens this
conceptual order because it undermines the clarity of traditional heterosexual
male and female gender identities, and hence undermines what are judged to
be appropriate male and female social roles, authority, and power. By failing
to conform to the heterosexual definition of masculinity, gay men appear both
to surrender their masculine privileges and to threaten the masculine privileges
of other males. First, by being attracted to other men-a sign of
femininity-they cheapen or ambiguate the masculinity and manliness of
heterosexuals. Second, the mere presence of homosexual men causes
heterosexual men to imagine that they could be objects of sexual desire by
other men, which leads them to fear that they will be "feminized" and hence
emasculated. 6' This fear is particularly threatening precisely because the
system of social meanings does not treat men and women equally: To play the
role of "woman" is to be dominated and subordinate. In like fashion, lesbians
threaten the conceptual order of male and female because they are attracted to
women. They undermine the subordinate role of femininity because they refuse
their roles as wives and mothers within a traditional heterosexual family.'69
Homosexuals have low status because they transgress a set of social
meanings about gender that define heterosexuality. This is a causal explanation
of a social phenomenon of discrimination and not a claim about the inherent
nature of either gender or homosexuality. This subordination is unjust on its
own terms and not derivative from the subordination of women. Andrew
Koppelman has recently argued that the taboo against homosexuality is wrong
because of sexism. In other words, he is arguing that "compulsory
heterosexuality keeps women in relationships in which men exert power over
their lives."'170 By contrast, I am not claiming that discrimination against
homosexuals is merely a "side effect" of discrimination against women, and
therefore somehow less important. Therefore it is important to avoid several
possible confusions about the argument.
First, I am not claiming that discrimination against homosexuals is unjust
because it worsens the situation of straight women. I am claiming that gender
categories are general forms of social subordination that subordinate the
feminine and all things associated with the feminine. Thus, this system




168. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 167, at 159 (describing system of social meanings in terms of taboo
against homosexuality).
169. See id.
170. Id. at 170.
171. See Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The
Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1995).
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Second, the argument does not require clear-cut distinctions between
homosexual and bisexual identity. Nor does it assume that sexual orientations
and gender identities cannot exist along a continuum. A continuum also
transgresses the dominant set of social meanings, which is essentially
bivalent."'
Finally, I am not claiming that "gender" and gender identities are simply
what heterosexuality defines them to be. Homosexuals and bisexuals may have
their own views about gender and gender identity which may conflict with
dominant views.
What I am claiming is: (I) that there are a dominant set of social meanings
about gender that benefit heterosexuals and view heterosexuality as normal; (2)
that these social meanings are also patriarchical in that they privilege
masculinity over femininity and view things associated with the feminine as
inferior or subordinate; and (3) that they are the source of heterosexual
disapproval of homosexuality and bisexuality, which are judged as deviant
from the point of view of this system of social meanings.
What threatens gender hierarchy is not so much what homosexuals do as
the meaning of what they do. Because meaning matters, heterosexuals can deal
with the threat of homosexuality in two different ways: They can pretend that
it does not exist, or, if this is not possible, they can openly castigate it and
declare it abnormal, immoral, and deviant. Each strategy helps preserve the
traditional system of gender relations as normal, natural, and justified.
Homosexuals who stay in the closet do not threaten the system of social
meanings, because they do not appear as transgressors. However, if they do
make an issue of their identity, it is important to demarcate them as outliers
whose behavior is abnormal and immoral.
Just as whites have a stake in the preservation of their racial identity, so
too heterosexuals (and particularly heterosexual men) have a stake in the
preservation of their gender identity. Homosexuals undermine social meanings
about gender that perpetuate male supremacy; homosexuality also threatens
notions of family organized around patriarchal privilege. Demands by
homosexuals for increased status-which include challenging the idea that they
are immoral and deviant-undermine the superordinate identity of
heterosexuals as surely as demands by blacks or women undermine the
superordinate identities of whites and males.
Thinking about homosexuality in terms of social hierarchies helps explain
why not all sexual taboos are equally suspect. For example, a standard
objection to the protection of homosexuals is that they cannot be distinguished
172. See Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodony: Act and Identiry i and After Bowers v Hardwick.
79 VA. L. REV. 1721 (1993); Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Pohitics of Biology. A Critique
of the Argunentfron lImnutabilit'. 46 STAN. L. Rh\v 503 (1994)
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from other sexual deviants, in particular pedophiles. However, a status-based
analysis helps show why this argument is unpersuasive.
t73
Pedophiles tend to prey on both girls and boys. There is no reason to
think, therefore, that discrimination against pedophiles stems from a desire to
preserve unjust traditional gender roles or an unjust set of social meanings
about gender. Pedophiles do not transgress gender roles. Indeed, the common
stereotypes that pedophiles are disproportionately homosexual-or that
homosexuals are disproportionately pedophiles-are false and offensive
reflections of antihomosexual bias. They attempt to degrade homosexuals by
associating them with particularly reprehensible forms of sexual deviance.
Furthermore, sexual relationships with children are inherently exploitative,
or so likely to be exploitative that society has good reasons for forbidding
them as a class. By contrast, there is no reason to think that sexual
relationships between adult homosexual men or adult homosexual women are
inherently or predominantly exploitative. In particular, there is no reason to
believe that relationships between adult homosexuals are likely to be more
exploitative than heterosexual adult sexual relationships, whether in or outside
of marriage. Even though sexual exploitation between adults goes on all the
time, it makes more sense to try to prohibit this sexual exploitation directly
than for society to outlaw all adult sexual relationships for fear that some of
them might be exploitative. A similar logic, however, does not apply to sexual
relationships between adults and children.
The argument that sexual relationships between adults and children are
exploitative is surely a moral (and political) judgment. How is this moral
judgment different from the moral disapproval of homosexuality? The point of
a status-based analysis is not to disregard moral objections simply because they
are moral; if that were so we could make no moral judgments at all, including
those about the need to dismantle unjust status hierarchies. Rather, the point
is that because people use moral arguments to justify existing status
hierarchies, we must try to be morally critical about claims of morality. The
question is whether moral condemnations are linked to the preservation of an
unjust form of status hierarchy. If they are, the Constitution cannot defer to
majoritarian moral judgments simply because they are moral judgments.
Conversely, absent a persuasive argument that moral disapproval of pedophilia
173. As a threshold matter, it is by no means clear that pedophiles form a distinct status group.
Although being a pedophile is certainly low status, it is not clear that pedophiles currently understand
themselves as a social group with distinctive claims to honor and esteem. By itself, this strikes me as an
insufficient reason for distinguishing discrimination against homosexuals from discrimination against
pedophiles. Political groups like the North American Man-Boy Love Association already exist. Pedophiles
might have their own equivalent of Stonewall, and attain some measure of group consciousness. The real
question is how we know that discrimination against pedophiles and the criminalization of pedophilia are
not reflections of an unjust status hierarchy, in the same way that discrimination against homosexuals and
criminalization of homosexual sodomy are.
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is deeply connected to the preservation of an oppressive social structure, we
should leave the legality of pedophilia to judgments of democratic politics.
The reason to be suspicious of moral condemnation of homosexuality is
the existence of a pervasive social hierarchy organized around social meanings
of masculinity and femininity, a hierarchy which homosexuality transgresses.
To be similarly suspicious about our moral condemnation of pedophilia as
exploitative, we would need more than hypothetical moral disagreement about
the proprieties of sex with children. We would need an account of social
structure that justifies our suspicions. We would have to show that the present
taboo against adult-child sex in our current society is systematically connected
to the oppression of an identifiable social group due to its refusal to assign
children an unjustified and inappropriate role of relative sexual innocence. We
would have to show that no psychological, physical, or emotional harm comes
to children from early sexual relations with adults and that adult-child liaisons
do not reflect unfair relationships of power, but are healthy for adults and
children alike. Finally, we would have to show that the reason for the taboo
lies elsewhere: that it is part and parcel of a system that attempts to preserve
a monopoly on sexual activity for adults alone, wrongfully oppresses children
who stray from this prohibition, and wrongfully subjugates the adults who
attempt to facilitate their sexual liberation, particularly fathers who attempt to
"liberate" their daughters.
Perhaps I am wrong about this, but I doubt very much whether a
convincing argument of this sort could be made. It simply rings false as a
claim about how social structure is currently organized in this country.' The
phenomenon of pedophilia appears to be, if anything, less a transgression of
oppressive sexual taboos by courageous eight-year-olds than a problem of
adults (and particularly male adults) asserting sexual privileges and sexual
power over children. It seems to have much more in common with patriarchal
dominance than with antihierarchical revolution.
In short, the status-based analysis advocated here is not simply an open
invitation to disregard moral values we dislike. It requires us to ground our
critique in a convincing account of social structure; it demands that we
describe how society is stratified and explain what produces this stratification.
Analyzing discrimination in terms of status groups also helps us
understand our objections to discrimination more clearly in situations where
courts hold that the Constitution already proscribes it. Discrimination against
174. To be sure, childhood and childhood sexuality arc deeply problematized in contemporary
American society. Parents may be increasingly protective and fearful about their children's sexuality Their
concern over childhood sexuality and their continual need for reassurance about the sexual innocence of
children may lead to hysterical and unjustified allegations of child abuse. But these phenomena hardly
demonstrate that most children are being sexually oppressed by their inability to form consensual sexual
relationships with adults, or that adults who seek to have sex with children are victims of an oppressive
social structure.
236519971
HeinOnline -- 106 Yale L.J. 2365 1996-1997
The Yale Law Journal
blacks, for example, is not unjust simply because race is an immutable
characteristic. Focusing on immutability per se confuses biological with
sociological considerations. It confuses the physical existence of the trait with
what the trait means in a social system. Racial discrimination is wrong because
of the historical creation of a status hierarchy organized around the meaning
of skin color. The question to ask is not whether a trait is immutable, but
whether there has been a history of using the trait to create a system of social
meanings, or define a social hierarchy, that helps dominate and oppress people.
Any conclusions about the importance of immutability already presuppose a
view about background social structure.
Indeed, a focus on immutability makes sense only as long as we recognize
its relationship to social structure. Social hierarchies often assign differential
social meanings to immutable traits because they make exit from low status
more difficult. 75 But not all immutable characteristics are or have been the
basis for unjust social hierarchies, and not all unjust social hierarchies are
founded on immutable characteristics.
Religion is not an immutable trait-many religions are always looking for
new converts-but status-based discrimination against religious groups is
surely also unjust. Defenders of the immutability criterion can point to the
Religion Clauses as an independent justification for protection of religious
minorities; but this puts the cart before the horse. The Religion Clauses exist
in part because the Framers recognized that religious intolerance was an evil
long before they recognized that racial intolerance was.
The importance of immutability as a criterion of judgment is also
sometimes defended on the grounds that immutable characteristics-for
example, race-are morally irrelevant. But this argument, too, really depends
on a view about the justness of a particular status hierarchy. When status
distinctions are internalized in a culture, status hierarchies make traits morally
relevant. They become signs of positive and negative associations. They
become permissible proxies for inferences about character, honesty, ability, and
judgment. Such traits are morally irrelevant only to persons not in the grip of
that particular hierarchy. In the aristocracy of pre-Revolutionary America, for
example, high birth was viewed as correlating with many other positive
attributes-honesty, sagacity, learning, and good manners-and society was
organized to make these positive associations a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Generations of whites thought blacks naturally inferior; succeeding generations
who learned not to make biological arguments have nevertheless continued to
regard blacks as culturally inferior-as displaying negative qualities of sloth,
violence, and licentiousness. A characteristic becomes "morally irrelevant"
175. Although often so-called immutable traits need considerable support from law and culture to
remain stable markers of superiority and inferiority. Legal and cultural rules defining who is black and
white are good examples. See sources cited supra notes 30, 149; infra note 187.
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precisely when we understand the status hierarchy it is based on to be unjust.
Only then do we become embarrassed to use the trait as a signifier of, or a
proxy for, positive or negative associations. Our objection to the moral
relevance of the characteristic is really our objection to the system of social
meanings and the hierarchy of social status that uses this trait as a criterion for
judgment.176 The real issue is whether society has created an unjust status
hierarchy organized around a particular trait or set of traits, whether those traits
are immutable, or-like religion-voluntarily chosen or instilled through
socialization.
E. Status Hierarchy and Democratic Culture
When we interpret civil rights in terms of status groups, we replace the
inquiry into discrimination based on immutable traits with an inquiry into
systems of social meaning and status hierarchy. In this way we make group
conflict and group hierarchy central to the study of constitutional liberty. This
way of thinking about group conflict sheds light on one of the Supreme
Court's oldest models for judicial protection of minorities: the famous
Carolene Products footnote, written by Justice Harlan F. Stone.'7 In large
part because of John Hart Ely's work,' 71 we associate this footnote today
with a process-based theory of the Constitution and judicial review. I would
like to suggest now that footnote four is also concerned with the problem of
unjust status hierarchies in a democracy. In hindsight, the language of the
famous footnote points, however awkwardly and haltingly, toward sociological
as well as procedural concerns. Reinterpreted in this way, it offers an effective
rejoinder to Justice Scalia's thesis in Romer v. Evans. The Constitution cannot
be neutral in cultural struggles because democracies will not always dismantle
unjust status hierarchies on their own.
Implicit in the theory of Carolene Products is the insight that the merely
formal features of democracy are insufficient. The Constitution demands more
than democratic procedures; it also demands that we create a democratic
culture. If American democracy is to survive, democratic processes must be
nourished by democratic forms of social organization. Without the fertile soil
of democratic culture, democracy will die; like an opportunistic weed, tyranny
will spring up in its stead. The third paragraph of footnote four suggests that
176. Again, it is sometimes thought that the problem is that immutable traits are linked to stereotyping
Yet stereotyping is simply a pejorative expression for the types of social generahzations we use in everyday
social judgement: for example, that fast food is unhealthy, or that Republican politicians are beholden to
big business. Surely not all fast food is unhealthy, and some Democrats are probably more in the pocket
of malefactors of great wealth than some Republicans, What makes stereotypes constitutionally
objectionable is that they are part of a system of social meanings used to oppress some groups and benelit
others.
177. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n4 (1938)
178. See JOHN HART ELY. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980)
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prejudice against "discrete and insular minorities" is a "special condition" that
might undermine democratic processes, processes that would ordinarily be
expected to protect minorities.'79 Implicit in this suggestion is a perceived
conflict between democracy and prejudicial treatment of certain kinds of social
groups. One reason for this conflict-most clearly implied by Justice Stone-is
that when this "special condition" occurs, social groups are unable to form
coalitions with other groups to protect their interests."' Beyond this,
however, is a deeper and more important reason: Democracy and democratic
culture are themselves incompatible with certain kinds of prejudices against
social groups. This "special condition"-this prejudicial treatment of particular
social groups-is ultimately corrosive of and threatening to democratic
institutions and democratic culture.
Although not stated by Justice Stone, this second reason is essential to
understanding and justifying the first. If democracy is simply the rule of the
majority, then the preferences of the majority should ordinarily be
sacrosanct.' If majorities want to preserve a system of social
hierarchy-because it reflects their vision of morality and propriety-they
should be permitted to have their way. This is, in yet another form, Justice
Scalia's theory about the proper role of constitutions in times of cultural
struggle or Kulturkampf.
But democracy is not merely a formal theory about majority rule.
Democracy is more than just a matter of letting majorities have their way, or,
more correctly, it is more than a matter of letting elites elected by majorities
have their way. It is also a theory about the proper organization of society and
the proper mode of social relations. Democracy is premised on the
establishment and preservation of a certain type of culture, a democratic
culture. This deeper, substantive, and cultural vision of democracy is and must
be opposed to unjust social hierarchy and caste, even when supported by a
majority of citizens, and even when justified by appeals to morality and
tradition.
This substantive vision of democratic processes supported by a larger
culture of democracy is necessary to explain why we care about the inability
of minority groups to form coalitions. After all, we do not worry about the
inability of many interest groups to form successful alliances. If opticians are
defeated by optometrists and ophthalmologists," 2 or if debt adjusters or
179. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
180. See ELY, supra note 178, at 151; Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L.
REv. 713, 720 (1985).
181. That is, unless they violate the Bill of Rights, which is the concern of paragraph one of the
footnote. Even here a court might defer to the majority's reading of what constitutes a violation of the Bill
of Rights.
182. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
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skating rink owners fail to form winning coalitions," 3 we do not fear that
democracy or democratic culture is undermined. If we are worried about the
political prospects of some groups, it is because they exist in the interstices of
a cultural system of subordination that we find profoundly and pervasively
undemocratic. We care about them because we think that status hierarchies are
hostile to democratic culture.
Justice Stone's emphasis on "minorities" is connected to his view that
democracy can ordinarily be expected to remedy unjust legislation. In some
societies, the hierarchy of status is organized like a pyramid; comparatively
few people are at the top, and the lower one's status, the greater the population
of one's status group. As long as fair procedures are required (paragraph two
of footnote four), democracy can be expected to undermine status hierarchy in
the long run. Lower status people will simply have more votes. Recognizing
that gains in status for some will mean corresponding losses for others, low
status majorities will use the power of the state to increase their status at the
expense of those higher up, resulting in a gradual movement toward status
equality. Because status is a relative good, low status majorities can be
expected to dismantle status hierarchies in procedurally fair democracies. That
at least is the assumption, although the case of women tends to show that it is
seriously incomplete.
However, in many societies-including our own-social stratification is
shaped more like a vase than a pyramid. As before, there are comparatively
few people with very high status; but members of very low status groups may
also tend to be comparatively few in number. The largest group of people in
the middle will have the most votes. It will tend to be fairly well-protected, but
low status groups will not be. Here ordinary democratic processes work against
the eventual dismantling of status hierarchy. The middle ranks of the status
"vase" may well be tempted to keep some groups on the bottom because this
reinforces their own comparatively high status. For example, white middle-
class and working-class Americans might hope to retain the comparatively
higher status of being white. In short, even in an otherwise well-functioning
democracy, majorities may have an interest in perpetuating status hierarchies
over low status minorities to preserve their status capital. This result is due less
to failures of coalition building than to the fact that status is a relative
good.
84
183. See City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989) (skating nnk owners); Ferguson v Skrupa.
372 U.S. 726 (1963) (debt adjusters).
184. Nevertheless, because populations are not uniformly distbuted. minorities may hold a much
higher percentage of the vote in specific areas: Blacks and Hispanics in large urban areas or homosexuals
in specific cities like San Francisco and Aspen, Colorado This may allow them to form winning coalitions
with other groups despite their lower status. In larger areas however. their minonty status reemerges To
some extent this explains the politics of Romer: Boulder and Aspen had gay rights ordinances that were
nullified by statewide referendum. This phenomenon is the flip side of the Madisonian notion that small
communities tend to produce oppressive factions that are avoided in a national political process See THE
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This account shows us that Justice Stone's language is entirely apt:
Prejudice against "discrete and insular minorities" is a "special condition" that
prevents democratic procedures from moving us toward a more democratic
culture. However, the condition is not "special" because it is "exceptional"-
because democracies normally do not feature status hierarchies. Indeed,
democratic governments almost always exist against the backdrop of some
forms of unjust status hierarchy. The problem has always been how to
vindicate democracy in a society whose social organization is in important
respects opposed to democratic culture. The condition Stone speaks of is
"special" because it is a case where democratic procedures cannot be expected
eventually to lead to a more democratic form of social organization. Here the
zero-sum game of status politics works democracy into a rut, using the power
of majorities to preserve unjust status hierarchies that they rightly see are in
their interest to retain.
"Discreteness" and "insularity" are problematic terms. Neither term is
synonymous with immutability. One might think the point is to protect
"unpopular" groups. Yet political unpopularity is not the same thing as low
social status in a status hierarchy. Rich people, for example, are often
politically unpopular, but they do not have low social status. Quite the
contrary: They are unpopular because they have high social status. Most people
want to be rich even though they know that the rich are envied and resented;
but most nonblacks do not want to be black. That is the difference between
merely unpopular groups and groups on the bottom of a social hierarchy.
The language of "discrete and insular minorities" points, however
awkwardly, toward the reality of status hierarchy and status competition in
democratic societies. The metaphors of "discreteness" and "insularity" describe
features of particularly egregious kinds of status hierarchies. They are
inadequate metaphors because they describe special cases of more general
phenomena. Both terms really refer to different forms of division and
distinction through which status hierarchies are maintained and reproduced."8 5
FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
185. I do not claim that the Justices who joined Stone's opinion were covert social theorists. They
were lawyers trying to understand the political and social problems of their times. They knew of America's
racial problems, and the dangers of religious intolerance. They saw Fascism brewing in Europe. During the
years immediately before and after the 1937 constitutional revolution they had decided several cases
protecting religious and ethnic minorities, but it was not clear to them how judicial review that protected
minorities could be reconciled with the new thesis of judicial deference. See J.M. Balkin, The Footnote,
83 Nw. U. L. REV. 275, 297 (1989).
Their preliminary ideas on the problem of minority rights were unclear and unformed. They were
dropped into a footnote, a mere placeholder for a discussion to be offered later. See id. They combined
sociological insight with a rather primitive pluralist model of interest group politics. They offered a
suggestion expressed in metaphors, not a well-worked-out theory. Yet what these Justices said makes as
much sense in the language of status as it does in the language of procedural perfection. If the metaphors
are imperfectly suited to describe the reality of status hierarchy, they are even less well-suited to describe
procedural obstacles of interest group pluralism. See Ackerman, supra note 180, at 724-28.
Behind the Carolene Products footnote, I claim, is something more than an intuition about pluralist
bargaining, or the special capacities of legally trained jurists to devise and enforce fair procedures. It is the
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Why emphasize this interpretation? The paradigmatic case of a "discrete
and insular minority" in Stone's footnote surely must have been African
Americans. Yet neither metaphor really applies to the paradigmatic case. Take
discreteness: African Americans do not have one set of skin colors, or one set
of facial features. Their color varies from dark to light; some can hardly be
distinguished from whites, Hispanics, or Asian Americans. Nor are African
Americans always "insular" in a geographical sense. There are now many
racially segregated communities in the United States. But they were not always
thus, particularly in the Jim Crow South. 86 Indeed, during the height of
slavery, blacks were clearly not geographically isolated; they lived alongside
whites. They were simply subordinate to them in all respects. A similar point
can be made about women. Women are not geographically isolated from men
but live with them as wives, daughters, and sisters.
We can make better sense of these metaphors if we reimagine them in
terms of status hierarchies. Discreteness and insularity are metaphors of
division that describe, albeit from a limited perspective, certain features of
particularly egregious status hierarchies. "Discreteness," for example, really
concerns the cultural categories that distinguish groups. In a status hierarchy,
cultural markers-including dress, language, appearance, behavior, systems of
belief, styles of life, or even so-called immutable characteristics-demarcate
members of status groups and organize them into hierarchies. "Discreteness"
refers to what distinguishes people into groups so that stratification can
proceed. Yet the metaphor is also partly misleading because this semiotic
organization can exist either in binary categories or along a continuum. For
example, it is possible both for whites to have higher social status than blacks,
and for lighter-skinned blacks to have higher social status than darker-skinned
blacks. Discrimination against darker-skinned blacks by lighter-skinned blacks
should not be constitutionally unprotected simply because there is no bright
line that separates them." 7
"Insularity" is also a metaphor of division. The lower status of
subordinated status groups can make them "insular," but not necessarily
because they live by themselves. The metaphor is misleading to the extent that
it suggests geographical separation. Insularity really concerns the multiple and
recognition that social hierarchies are the enemy of a wcll-functioning democracy because the) undermine
the possibility of a democratic culture necessary to support democratic processes Both democracy and
democratic culture are, in the long run, in tension with an), sustained and ossified system of social
superiority and inferiority.
186. For example, busing was sometimes used as a tool of segregation because blacks and whites lived
sufficiently close together that neighborhood school policies would not effectively segregate the races See,
e.g., Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 432 (1968) (finding that although New Kent County was
not residentially segregated, white and black students were bussed to schools on opposite sides of county)
187. See Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: A Darker Shade of Pale (Mar 1996) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author). Precisely because it was not always easy to tell who was white and who
was black, racial categories were defined and reinforced through legal rules of hypodescent See DAvis.
supra note 30, at 54-55, 62-63, 78-79, 113-14
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mutually reinforcing terms of a group's subordination. As I have argued
previously, the Constitution is and should be concerned with status groups
whose identity pervasively affects their interactions with others. Members of
"insular" low status groups suffer from any number of forms of exclusion and
separation that mark off social superiors from social inferiors-ranging from
housing patterns and membership in social organizations and family alliances,
to business contacts and the ability to form political coalitions. What these
examples all have in common is not geographical isolation, but forms of
separation and exclusion-in whatever sphere of life-that connote social
inferiority. Insularity in this sense refers to the various and mutually supporting
forms of social division that simultaneously symbolize, enact, and reinforce
social superiority and inferiority."' 8
Today we tend to read Justice Stone's words in light of the doctrinal
glosses on equal protection that came afterwards: a relatively rigid system
consisting of three tiers of scrutiny, with their accompanying verbal formulae.
But at the time Stone wrote, he was making a simple point. The Supreme
Court had just decided to overthrow the practice of judicial review of
legislation of the Lochner era, and substitute a new practice of judicial
deference based on respect for democratic processes. Hence all legislation was
to be granted a strong presumption of constitutionality. Carolene Products is
written in precisely these terms. The problem facing Stone and his colleagues
was why a court would ever strike down anything at all. Why not always
defer? To justify judicial intervention, Stone had to have a theory of what
special situations would not justify the presumption of constitutionality. This
theory required, among other things, a theory of what democracy was. This is
the predicament of the 1937 revolution: To truly respect democracy one has
to have an understanding of what it is one is respecting. Otherwise, one may
188. To see the advantage of this interpretation, consider once again the case of homosexuality. Under
the traditional understanding of Carolene Products, the fact that many homosexuals are closeted (or out
to some people but not to others) creates a significant problem. Homosexuals could be understood either
as discrete and insular (to the extent that they are out) or as anonymous and diffuse (to the extent that they
remain partly or completely closeted). See Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 531, 548 (1992); Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny
for Gays, 96 COLtJM. L. REv. 1753, 1809-10 (1996).
This problem does not occur under my interpretation of insularity. Because insularity refers to the
social meaning of homosexuality, homosexuals are insular whether or not they are closeted. To Identify
themselves as homosexual is to invite distancing, separation, and stigmatization. To fail to identify as
homosexual requires them to pass as heterosexual, or, at the least, not to call attention to their
homosexuality.
Homosexuals can live and work alongside heterosexuals, but often only by hiding their
homosexuality. For example, in the Hurley case, the Irish-American organizers of the St. Patrick's Day
parade were willing to allow homosexuals to march in the parade as long as they did not identify
themselves as such. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 115 S. Ct. 2338, 2347
(1995). If they insisted on identifying themselves, they would have to be excluded. Similarly, under the
military's "don't-ask-don't-tell" policy, homosexuals may serve in the military as long their sexual
orientation is not revealed. Once it is revealed, they must be excluded from military service. This is social
separation achieved through other means. The same argument applies to all groups who have the possibility
of passing as members of superordinate groups, including light-skinned blacks.
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end up, in the name of democracy, deferring to political actions that corrode
and destroy it. One can "respect" democracy so much that one is left with
something very different in its place.
That is why Justice Stone's theory of process representation really rests on
a deeper meaning of democracy, democracy as premised on democratic culture.
This theory of democracy has its roots in the social transformation that
accompanied the American Revolution. The revolt against monarchy and
aristocratic privilege is the heritage that informs and should inform our vision
of democratic culture. It is an ideal toward which society strives, but which it
never fully achieves-a world in which citizens are equal not only civilly and
politically, but also socially, in which all unjust distinctions of rank and
prestige have melted away. True democracy rests on democratic culture, and
democratic culture remains an unfinished project.
IV. CONCLUSION
Each of the essays in this Symposium touches on different examples of
group conflict and different aspects of status competition and status hierarchy.
Their concerns range from gay rights to school choice to race-based voting
districts.
Robin Bames's piece describes the problems of African-American parents
who want to improve the quality of their children's education."t 9 Her story
of the fight over Mark Twain's The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn is a
classic example of a status conflict, in which each side feels the other lacks
proper understanding and respect.
Rick Pildes argues that the Supreme Court's voting rights cases beginning
with Shaw v. Reno'90 are best understood as remedying dignitary harm to
groups-in effect, harm to group status."9' The Supreme Court has held
constitutionally suspect majority-minority districts with bizarre shapes, but has
suggested that districts with relatively regular and compact shapes pose no
such problem. Pildes explains this distinction in terms of the message sent to
constituents. Bizarrely shaped districts suggest that some groups have received
special treatment on the basis of race, while compact districts do not send so
blatant a message of racial favoritism. In Pildes's analysis, appearances do
matter, because symbolism matters. Thus the harm the Court seems to be
concerned about in Shaw and its progeny is actually an injury to group status,
in this case the racial status of white voters.
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Finally, both Bill Eskridge and Robert George attempt to find ways out of
the zero-sum game of status competition. 9' For George, the answer lies in
a proper understanding of political theory. Liberal theory cannot offer a
remedy to group conflict until it takes account of continuing and deep divisions
in worldviews. Eskridge believes that courts can help bring parties together
through expressing respect for both sides. By showing empathy for both
positions, a court can fashion accommodations that give each side some
measure of dignity and respect.
The status-based approach I have offered in this Essay argues that we
cannot understand how constitutional doctrine should be organized until we
understand how society is organized. It requires us to look carefully at the
structure of the society in which we live, to identify social stratification where
it exists, and to recognize the possible connections between the moral
justifications that majorities offer and the preservation of their superior status.
This approach is flexible and open-ended. Social hierarchies appear in many
forms and degrees: We should not imagine that there is a single test or a single
clause of the Constitution that can deal with all of them fully and adequately.
The social transformations begun by the American Revolution are by no
means completed; nor has this country achieved a fully democratic culture.
Like the words of the Declaration itself, the legal doctrines developed at any
period of time will always be imperfect articulations of the democratic ideal.
Indeed, because law is part of social structure, legal doctrines will usually be
complicit in preserving status hierarchies even when they claim to be
dismantling them.
We cannot avoid having constitutional doctrines simply because they may
turn out to be inadequate or imperfect. But we can avoid believing that the
truth about society is described within them. Thinking about social equality in
terms of status gives us some distance from the project of doctrinal exegesis.
It gives that task a deeper meaning; and it helps preserve the open-ended
character of our inquiry. Th'tis open-endedness is necessary to the fulfillment
of the ideal of democratic equality expressed in our Declaration. Perhaps if we
pay attention to the constitution of status, we can bring that ideal a few steps
closer to reality.
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